Nach der Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungs­gerichts im NPD-Verbotsverfahren – Kein Geld mehr für Verfassungsfeinde!?

Neben dem Parteiverbot könnte in Art. 21 Abs. 2 GG, quasi als milderes Mittel, ein zweiter Fall geregelt werden. Für diesen wäre nicht erforderlich, dass eine als verfassungsfeindlich erkannte Partei eine reale Chance zur Verwirklichung ihrer Ziele hat. Im Übrigen entsprächen die Kriterien des zweiten Falls denen des Parteiverbots. Seine rechtliche Folge wäre eine Streichung oder Kürzung der staatlichen Teilfinanzierung.

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Die eventuell, aber nicht potenziell verfassungswidrige NPD

Die NPD, das hat das Bundesverfassungsgericht heute festgestellt, ist verfassungsfeindlich, aber nicht verfassungswidrig. Dazu fehlt ihr zum Wollen das Können. Das wirft die Frage auf: was fangen wir mit einer solchen Wollen-aber-nicht-Können-Verfassungsfeindpartei jetzt an?

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Der Demokratie zumutbar? Zum NPD-Verbotsurteil des BVerfG

Das heutige Urteil zum Verbotsantrag des Bundesrats gegen die NPD kann als Verantwortungszuweisung für die Auseinandersetzung mit parteipolitischem Extremismus verstanden werden. Das Parteiverbot stellt in der jetzigen Situation keine wirksame Waffe des Staates im Kampf gegen rechtsextreme Parteien dar. Damit rückt der freie gesellschaftliche Diskurs in den Vordergrund, für den der Staat, auch das betont das BVerfG, die Rahmenbedingungen zu schaffen hat.

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How to Kill an Idea: An American’s Observations on the NPD Party-Ban Proceedings

Next Tuesday, the German Federal Constitutional Court will announce its decision on the federal states’ application seeking to ban the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). In times of a far-right surge all over Europe, the procedure offers ample opportunity to reflect on a constitutional democracy’s right to take repressive measures against odious ideas.

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Constitutional Review as an Indispensable Element of the Rule of Law? Poland as the Divided State between Political and Legal Constitutionalism

The power of constitutional courts appears to be a political matter which depends on the political majority and public support notwithstanding their desirability in certain political contexts, in particular in countries with relatively young democratic traditions and authoritarian pasts. This might not be the best news for modern constitutionalism but one we need to be aware of, in particular in times of the recent re-rise of populist movements, illiberal disenchantment, and anti-establishment rhetoric – not only in Poland.

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Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal under PiS control descends into legal chaos

Immediately after the governing Law and Justice party in Poland established its control over the Constitutional Tribunal, the court has plunged into a whole number of legal imbroglios undermining its authority and calling into question the legality of its verdicts. The new President’s nomination is contested even by a supposed ally, and the remaining "old" judges seem to have adopted a strategy of passive resistance. This is probably what Law and Justice wanted to achieve: it is much easier to govern without a strong constitutional court.

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The Hungarian Constitutional Court and Constitutional Identity

Ever since the 2010 parliamentary elections Hungary has set off on the journey to became an ‘illiberal’ member state of the EU, which does not comply with the shared values of rule of law and democracy, the ‘basic structure’ of Europe. The new government of Viktor Orbán from the very beginning has justified the non-compliance by referring to national sovereignty, and lately to the country’s constitutional identity guaranteed in Article 4 (2) TEU. This constitutional battle started with the invalid anti-migrant referendum, was followed by the failed constitutional amendment, and concluded in early December last year by a decision of the Constitutional Court, in which the packed body in a binding constitutional interpretation rubber-stamped the constitutional identity defense of the Orbán government.

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Poland and the European Commission, Part II: Hearing the Siren Song of the Rule of Law

As Poland has careened away from the rule of law, the European Commission has struggled to work out its response. Given Europe’s multiple crises at the moment, the internal affairs of a rogue government or two may seem less critical to Europe’s well being than crises that affect multiple states at the same time, like the refugee crisis, the Euro-crisis or the fallout from Brexit. But the proliferation of governments inside the EU that no longer share basic European values undermines the reason for existence of the EU in the first place.

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Is Article 50 Reversible? On Politics Beyond Legal Doctrine

Can the United Kingdom, once it has declared its withdrawal from the EU, revoke this decision later on? This question is at the core of the ongoing case before the UK Supreme Court on Art. 50 TEU. I argue that revocability fits neatly in the letter and spirit of article 50 because of formal and substantive reasons. I further content that the Supreme Court decision may create a bifurcation in which interpretation of a key TEU provision may become purely an issue of domestic law. However, I further content that actors' political decisions have progressively framed a situation in which revocability does not seem politically possible.

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