nam 22 uu 4500 10.59704/0c606f6b4a0f3577 DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 240408s2024||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.59704/0c606f6b4a0f3577 doi eng 342 23 Verma, Maansi Author aut Amending the Constitution Without Deliberation - The Contemporary Indian Constitutionalism Experience Verma, Maansi Verfassungsblog 2024-04-08 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier India is undergoing a “deliberation backsliding”. Since the current government was elected to office in 2019, only 13% of all government bills introduced in Parliament were referred to Parliament Committees for detailed study, scrutiny and stakeholder consultations. While the deliberation deficit is concerning with respect to ordinary government bills, it becomes alarming with respect to bills which seek to amend the Indian Constitution. In this blog post, I argue that the promise of deliberative democracy in India is coming undone, which sets back the project of constitutionalism in India. CC BY-SA 4.0 Deliberative Democracy India Indian Constitution Indian Parliament (DE-588)1236319109 gnd India Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://verfassungsblog.de/amending-the-constitution-without-deliberation/ raw object