nam 22 uu 4500 10.17176/20230607-231101-0 DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 230607s2023||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.17176/20230607-231101-0 doi eng 342 23 van den Brink, Martijn Author aut An Inconvenient Constraint - A Hungarian Council Presidency and the EU’s Rule of Law van den Brink, Martijn Verfassungsblog 2023-06-07 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier On 1 July 2024, Hungary is set to take over the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. The European Parliament and the Meijers Committee issued reports questioning whether Hungary should be blocked from doing that. These proposals raise questions of political feasibility, however, especially as one may doubt if a Hungarian Council Presidency can do much practical damage to the EU. In addition, they also raise questions of legal feasibility. A logical prerequisite for preventing Hungary from holding the Presidency as long as it breaches the rule of law is that doing so is consistent with the EU’s own rule of law. I doubt it is. CC BY-SA 4.0 Art. 7 TEU Council Democratic Backsliding Hungary Rule of Law Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://verfassungsblog.de/an-inconvenient-constraint/ raw object