An Inconvenient Constraint - A Hungarian Council Presidency and the EU’s Rule of Law van den Brink, Martijn Author aut Text xx# 2023 Verfassungsblog 2023-06-07 eng
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 On 1 July 2024, Hungary is set to take over the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. The European Parliament and the Meijers Committee issued reports questioning whether Hungary should be blocked from doing that. These proposals raise questions of political feasibility, however, especially as one may doubt if a Hungarian Council Presidency can do much practical damage to the EU. In addition, they also raise questions of legal feasibility. A logical prerequisite for preventing Hungary from holding the Presidency as long as it breaches the rule of law is that doing so is consistent with the EU’s own rule of law. I doubt it is. CC BY-SA 4.0 van den Brink, Martijn Art. 7 TEU Council Democratic Backsliding Hungary Rule of Law 342 https://verfassungsblog.de/an-inconvenient-constraint/ Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH 10.17176/20230607-231101-0 230607 10.17176/20230607-231101-0 Converted from MARCXML to MODS version 3.7 using MARC21slim2MODS3-7.xsl (Revision 1.140 20200717)