nam 22 uu 4500 10.59704/cbf7b93e7764496f DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 261022s2026||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.59704/cbf7b93e7764496f doi eng 342 23 Marques Neto, Pedro Author aut The Legal Structure of the Incumbency Advantage - The Case of Brazil Marques Neto, Pedro Verfassungsblog 2026-10-22 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Imagine that you intend to run for president of the Republic, governor of a state, or mayor of a municipality. During the campaign, you can choose to run either as an ordinary candidate or as the current holder of the office you seek. Which option would you choose? The answer is intuitive: your chances of success are usually greater if you are running for reelection. This incumbency advantage is a well-known phenomenon. Less well known is the way electoral rules can contribute to mitigating or amplifying such an advantage. Recent presidential elections in Brazil and judicial decisions illustrate how a country’s legal structure interacts with the electoral advantage incumbents enjoy. CC BY-SA 4.0 Brasilien Brazil Election law Wahlrecht (DE-588)4008003-1 gnd Brasilien (DE-588)4064302-5 gnd Wahlrecht Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://verfassungsblog.de/brazil-incumbency-advantage/ raw object