nam 22 uu 4500 10.17176/20200501-013754-0 DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 200430s2020||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.17176/20200501-013754-0 doi eng 342 23 Uhlmann, Felix Author aut Concentration of Powers in the Federal Executive: The Application of Emergency Powers in Switzerland Uhlmann, Felix Verfassungsblog 2020-04-30 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Were we ready for the crisis? I do not mean whether Switzerland had enough hospital beds and ventilators, but whether its Federal Constitution was ready. Arguably, the former are vital, and as regards the latter, Switzerland is under no suspicion of losing its quality as a democracy and a Rechtsstaat. Still, the constitutional questions raised by the Corona crisis are troubling. The federal government is applying emergency powers unheard of since WW2, and which were previously unimaginable for most. Legal scholars are only starting to grapple the full implications of the crisis. CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 Coronavirus COVID 19 emergency powers executive powers federalism parliamentary control Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://verfassungsblog.de/concentration-of-powers-in-the-federal-executive-the-application-of-emergency-powers-in-switzerland/ raw object