nam 22 uu 4500 10.17176/20160701-094108 DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 160630s2016||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.17176/20160701-094108 doi eng 342 23 Baraggia, Antonia Author aut Conditionality through the lens of the CJEU: a “blurry” view Baraggia, Antonia Verfassungsblog 2016-06-30 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier From the very beginning of the Eurozone crisis, conditionality progressively entered into the vocabulary and the normative sphere of the EU economic governance. At the time of the first assistance package to Greece, conditionality was just an emergency tool set in the bilateral Loan Agreements, signed by Greece and other Members States. However, after the establishment of emergency funds like the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), and especially after the creation of a permanent institution, a sort of “European mirror image of the IMF” – the ESM – conditionality has become a sort of leitmotiv of the European response to the economic crisis or, even, a necessary requirement according to the ECJ. CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 conditionality euro crisis eurozone Memorandum of Understanding Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://verfassungsblog.de/conditionality-through-the-lens-of-the-cjeu-a-blurry-view/ raw object