nam 22 uu 4500 10.17176/20221130-001517-0 DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 221129s2022||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.17176/20221130-001517-0 doi eng 342 23 Gardiner, Patrick Author aut (orcid)0000-0002-5774-9296 Conflating the Powers of the Commissarial and the Sovereign Dictator in Tunisia Gardiner, Patrick Verfassungsblog 2022-11-29 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier On July 25, 2022, a year after Tunisian President Kais Saied declared a state of emergency and with only 28 percent of eligible voters participating, Tunisia ratified its new Constitution. Saied’s use of wide emergency powers to help sideline parliamentary opposition and support the constitution-making process, contradicts the underlying rational that emergency powers are needed in democratic states to defend the existing constitutional order against urgent and exceptional threats to the state. To preclude the potential misuse of emergency powers a state’s constitution should be designed to prevent the entity exercising emergency powers from simultaneously claiming that they represent the ‘broad popular will’ of the people. CC BY-SA 4.0 Carl Schmitt Constitutional Reform Dictatorship Kais Saied Tunisia Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://verfassungsblog.de/conflating-the-powers-of-the-commissarial-and-the-sovereign-dictator-in-tunisia/ raw object