<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<dc xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/ http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/simpledc20021212.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>http://dx.doi.org/10.17176/20220302-001101-0</dc:identifier>
  <dc:identifier>https://verfassungsblog.de/constitutional-complaint-as-orbans-tool/</dc:identifier>
  <dc:title>Constitutional Complaint as Orbán’s Tool - Judicial assistance for the reinforcement of the government’s interests</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Kazai, Viktor Z.</dc:creator>
  <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
  <dc:date>2022-03-01</dc:date>
  <dc:type>electronic resource</dc:type>
  <dc:format>text/html</dc:format>
  <dc:subject>ddc:342</dc:subject>
  <dc:subject>Constitutional Complaint</dc:subject>
  <dc:subject>Hungarian Constitutional Court</dc:subject>
  <dc:subject>Viktor Orbán</dc:subject>
  <dc:publisher>Verfassungsblog</dc:publisher>
  <dc:relation>Verfassungsblog--2366-7044</dc:relation>
  <dc:rights>CC BY-SA 4.0</dc:rights>
  <dc:description>The re-regulation of the ex-post review competence and the introduction of the “full” constitutional complaint in 2012 provided a good justification for the Constitutional Court to shift its focus from the control of the legislature dominated by the illiberal Fidesz government to the supervision of the judiciary. However, the justices have not remained simply deferential. They proactively helped to repurpose the constitutional complaint and convert a fundamental rights protection mechanism into a tool reinforcing the government’s interests.</dc:description>
</dc>
