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  <dc:identifier>http://dx.doi.org/10.17176/20210330-195055-0</dc:identifier>
  <dc:identifier>https://verfassungsblog.de/czechs-and-balances-one-year-later/</dc:identifier>
  <dc:title>Czechs and Balances – One Year Later</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Vikarská, Zuzana</dc:creator>
  <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
  <dc:date>2021-03-30</dc:date>
  <dc:type>electronic resource</dc:type>
  <dc:format>text/html</dc:format>
  <dc:subject>ddc:342</dc:subject>
  <dc:subject>COVID 19</dc:subject>
  <dc:subject>Czech Republic</dc:subject>
  <dc:publisher>Verfassungsblog</dc:publisher>
  <dc:relation>Verfassungsblog--2366-7044</dc:relation>
  <dc:rights>CC BY-SA 4.0</dc:rights>
  <dc:description>This blogpost analyses the Czech situation from the perspective of the rule of law requirements and identifies two main deficiencies: a significant and long-lasting shift of power to the executive, and an ostentatious lack of reasoning of the executive crisis measures. Fortunately, these ‘two tales of executive arrogance’ have been somewhat counterweighed by the legislature and the judiciary.</dc:description>
</dc>
