nam 22 uu 4500 10.59704/6dcbcf81e23133c5 DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 251008s2025||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.59704/6dcbcf81e23133c5 doi eng 342 23 Schäffer, Johannes Author aut EU Sanctions and the Mirage of Unanimity - Overcoming the Hungarian Veto One Step After Another Under the Letter of EU Law Schäffer, Johannes Verfassungsblog 2025-10-08 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The EU’s sanctions framework is meant to work in two steps: unanimity for decisions defining the Union’s approach to “a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature” under Article 29 TEU, and qualified majority voting for the necessary measures implementing these decisions under Article 215 TFEU. In reality, the two steps are collapsed into one, which magnifies the leverage of a single veto. This post makes the case for resequencing this practice which would realign decision-making with the Treaties’ design, reduce the risk of impasse, and improve speed and flexibility. CC BY-SA 4.0 Art. 215 TFEU Art. 29 TEU CFSP EU EU Hungary Sanctions Unanimity (DE-588)10290611-7 gnd EU Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://verfassungsblog.de/eu-sanctions-and-the-mirage-of-unanimity/ raw object