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  <titleInfo>
    <title>Germany’s Failing Court</title>
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    <namePart>Eleftheriadis, Pavlos</namePart>
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    <dateIssued encoding="marc">2020</dateIssued>
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    <publisher>Verfassungsblog</publisher>
    <dateIssued>2020-05-18</dateIssued>
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  <abstract displayLabel="Summary">The German Federal Constitutional Court’s PSPP judgment depends on three intricate principles that the Court says are implicit in the German constitution, to such an extent that they are ‘unamendable’ under the ‘eternity’ clause of Article 79. These principles, however, are unique to Germany and unfamiliar in other European jurisdictions. Thereby the German Court has taken a ultimately illegitimate turn towards a narrow and inward interpretation of its constitution, which inexplicably neglects its European dimension. Given the potential effects of Germany’s apparent defiance of EU law and in light of the current ongoing discussions about the desired increased burden-sharing among the winners and losers of the Eurozone, the internal constitutional argument in Germany is a matter of great significance for the future of the Eurozone.</abstract>
  <accessCondition type="use and reproduction">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0</accessCondition>
  <note type="statement of responsibility">Eleftheriadis, Pavlos</note>
  <subject>
    <topic>BVerfG</topic>
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  <subject>
    <topic>ECB</topic>
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  <subject>
    <topic>PSPP</topic>
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  <classification authority="ddc" edition="23">342</classification>
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    <identifier type="issn">2366-7044</identifier>
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      <namePart>Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH</namePart>
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  <identifier type="doi">10.17176/20200519-013420-0</identifier>
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