nam 22 uu 4500 10.17176/20230603-231019-0 DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 230603s2023||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.17176/20230603-231019-0 doi eng 342 23 Nguyen, Thu Author aut Institutional Corsets and the Question of Timing - How Much Damage Can the Hungarian Council Presidency Do? Nguyen, Thu Verfassungsblog 2023-06-03 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier There has been a lot of noise around whether Hungary should, and legally could, be blocked from taking over the Council presidency in the second half of 2024, considering the state of the rule of law in the country. On 1 June, the European Parliament adopted a resolution, questioning Hungary’s ability to “credibly fulfill” the tasks of a Council presidency and asking the Council to “find a proper solution as soon as possible”, else Parliament could take “appropriate measures”. Such concerns are legitimate, but another question seems to be sidelined in the debate: How much practical damage can the upcoming Council presidency under Hungary actually do in the EU? CC BY-SA 4.0 EU Council of Ministers EU Presidency European Union Hungary Rule of Law Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://verfassungsblog.de/institutional-corsets-and-the-question-of-timing/ raw object