nam 22 uu 4500 10.17176/20201118-161945-0 DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 201118s2020||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.17176/20201118-161945-0 doi eng 342 23 Tecimer, Cem Author aut “Is the Turkish Central Bank Independent?” as an Uninteresting Question Tecimer, Cem Verfassungsblog 2020-11-18 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Yes, the Turkish Central Bank’s independence has been eroded in recent years. Yes, from 2016 until now, the Bank has had four different presidents (or governors, as they are called), which is unusual by all accounts. No, the Bank is therefore probably not independent — or as independent — as its Western counterparts. I do not find these somewhat trite but true statements about the Bank’s independence (or the lack thereof) terribly interesting. Not that they are unimportant, but because I think the erosion of the Bank’s independence is illustrative of deeper and far more curious attributes of competitive authoritarian regimes and how they sustain themselves (or fail at doing that). CC BY-SA 4.0 institutional independence Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Turkey Turkish Central Bank Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://verfassungsblog.de/is-the-turkish-central-bank-independent-as-an-uninteresting-question/ raw object