nam 22 uu 4500 10.17176/20190711-014345-0 DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 190710s2019||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.17176/20190711-014345-0 doi eng 342 23 Avbelj, Matej Author aut Judges Depending on Judges - A Missing Brick in the CJEU Jurisprudence on Judicial Independence Avbelj, Matej Verfassungsblog 2019-07-10 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Since the beginning of 2018 the CJEU has finally been putting flesh on the bones of the EU principle of judicial independence. Most recently, the Court has been widely praised for its ruling against the Polish attempt of removing the, presumably, disloyal judges by a general measure of lowering their retirement age from 70 to 65. While the decision is indeed praiseworthy, it is nevertheless necessary to emphasize its notable doctrinal lacuna with potential negative practical implications – particularly in those EU member states with a weak democratic and rule of law tradition, a low degree of legal and political culture as well as with a small and tightly-knit legal elite. CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 judicial independence Judiciary Rule of Law Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://verfassungsblog.de/judges-depending-on-judges/ raw object