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        <dc:identifier>https://verfassungsblog.de/power-dsa-dma-01/</dc:identifier>
        <dc:title>The DSA Proposal’s Impact on Digital Dominance </dc:title>
        <dc:creator>Buri, Ilaria</dc:creator>
        <dc:creator>van Hoboken, Joris</dc:creator>
        <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
        <dc:date>2021-08-30</dc:date>
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        <dc:subject>ddc:342</dc:subject>
        <dc:subject>Digital Dominance</dc:subject>
        <dc:subject>DSA</dc:subject>
        <dc:subject>Platform Governance</dc:subject>
        <dc:publisher>Verfassungsblog</dc:publisher>
        <dc:relation>Verfassungsblog--2366-7044</dc:relation>
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        <dc:description>One of the most pressing questions in the ongoing debates about the Digital Services Act (DSA) proposal is the question of entrenching dominance. While the DSA aims at providing a harmonized regulatory framework for addressing online harms, there is a risk that imposing accountability at the threat of fines might increase the power of already dominant intermediaries. This problem is particularly evident for content moderation, where over the last decades a handful of services have consolidated their position as the primary arbiters of speech and online activity.</dc:description>
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