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        <dc:identifier>https://verfassungsblog.de/competition-and-conditionality/</dc:identifier>
        <dc:title>Competition and Conditionality - The missing piece of the puzzle in the case of Hungary?</dc:title>
        <dc:creator>Cseres, Kati</dc:creator>
        <dc:creator>Borgers, Michael</dc:creator>
        <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
        <dc:date>2022-06-02</dc:date>
        <dc:type>electronic resource</dc:type>
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        <dc:subject>ddc:342</dc:subject>
        <dc:subject>Conditionality Regulation</dc:subject>
        <dc:subject>European Commission</dc:subject>
        <dc:subject>Hungary</dc:subject>
        <dc:subject>Rule of Law</dc:subject>
        <dc:publisher>Verfassungsblog</dc:publisher>
        <dc:relation>Verfassungsblog--2366-7044</dc:relation>
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        <dc:description>On 5 April 2022, just two days after the Hungarian national elections, the European Commission formally announced that it would apply the conditionality mechanism enshrined in Regulation 2020/2092 in relation to Hungary. In the past the Commission has frequently addressed issues related to “systemic irregularities, deficiencies and weaknesses in public procurement procedures”. In Hungary, however, it has not probed the enforcement of competition (cartel) law in public tender procedures. The Commission should seize the opportunity to act in this area.</dc:description>
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