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      <datestamp>2025-12-04T16:31:48Z</datestamp>
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        <dc:identifier>https://verfassungsblog.de/taiwan-constitutional-court/</dc:identifier>
        <dc:title>Taiwan’s Constitutional Grey Hole - The Constitutional Court in Paralysis</dc:title>
        <dc:creator>Yang, Shao-Kai</dc:creator>
        <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
        <dc:date>2025-12-03</dc:date>
        <dc:type>electronic resource</dc:type>
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        <dc:subject>ddc:342</dc:subject>
        <dc:subject>Rule of Law</dc:subject>
        <dc:subject>Taiwan</dc:subject>
        <dc:subject>Taiwan</dc:subject>
        <dc:subject>Taiwan Constitutional Court</dc:subject>
        <dc:subject>separation of powers</dc:subject>
        <dc:subject>Taiwan</dc:subject>
        <dc:publisher>Verfassungsblog</dc:publisher>
        <dc:relation>Verfassungsblog--2366-7044</dc:relation>
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        <dc:description>Since late 2024, the Taiwan Constitutional Court has been unable to issue merits-based decisions. The Court is neither resolving separation-of-powers disputes between the executive and legislature nor providing fundamental rights protection for individuals. This institutional deadlock constitutes a constitutional “grey hole”, where only the form of the legal order exists, without any substantive protections. All proposed solutions carry limitations, and some may even exacerbate rather than alleviate the problem.</dc:description>
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