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  <titleInfo>
    <title>On the Nexus between Separation of Powers and Judicial Power</title>
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    <namePart>Weill, Rivka</namePart>
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    <publisher>Verfassungsblog</publisher>
    <dateIssued>2022-12-21</dateIssued>
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  <abstract displayLabel="Summary">This exercise in comparative constitutional law shows how, paradoxically, positioning a country on either side of the spectrum of separation of powers structures may lead to similar curtailment of the judiciary’s power, though courts in the two opposing regimes may use very different, and even opposing, judicial doctrines to reach similar non-interventionalist results. Moreover, though scholars typically study these common law judicial doctrines independently of one another, they are all a manifestation of how strong or weak the separation of powers in a given country is. Ultimately, the judicial branch may supplement, but not supplant, the democratically elected political branches, irrespective of the separation of powers in the country in question</abstract>
  <accessCondition type="use and reproduction">CC BY-SA 4.0</accessCondition>
  <note type="statement of responsibility">Weill, Rivka</note>
  <subject>
    <topic>family reunification</topic>
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  <subject>
    <topic>Judicial Review</topic>
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  <subject>
    <topic>separation of powers</topic>
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  <classification authority="ddc" edition="23">342</classification>
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    <identifier type="issn">2366-7044</identifier>
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      <namePart>Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH</namePart>
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  <identifier type="doi">10.17176/20221222-001634-0</identifier>
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