nam 22 uu 4500 10.59704/b016080111b36355 DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 231215s2023||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.59704/b016080111b36355 doi eng 342 23 Uitz, Renáta Author aut Orbán’s Veto Play – The Subsidiarity Card Uitz, Renáta Verfassungsblog 2023-12-15 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Viktor Orbán is known to use veto threats in the European Council to get his way. This time, he was keen to see that after months of tense exchanges with the Commission, Hungary gets access to EU funds that had been blocked in order to achieve compliance with the rule of law and fundamental rights conditionality. So, PM Orbán saw it fit to loudly contest Ukraine’s accession and the financial aid package of 50 billion Euros. This may be PM Orbán’s strongest veto play to date. CC BY-SA 4.0 conditionality mechanism EU funds European Commission Hungary Orban Veto Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://verfassungsblog.de/orbans-veto-play-the-subsidiarity-card/ raw object