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  <titleInfo>
    <title>Perils from Within and Without - The Constitutional Court of BiH Under Pressure</title>
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    <namePart>Išerić, Harun</namePart>
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    <namePart>Sahadžić, Maja</namePart>
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    <dateIssued encoding="marc">2023</dateIssued>
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    <publisher>Verfassungsblog</publisher>
    <dateIssued>2023-07-27</dateIssued>
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  <abstract displayLabel="Summary">The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is described as one of the few success stories of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). In contrast to the state-level legislature, the Court’s decision-making process in principle cannot be vetoed. Voting rules do not condition the presence of all three ethnic groups. This has made it difficult for Republika Srpska’s (RS) political leadership to block, boycott or undermine the work of the Court compared to other state-level institutions. However, recent months saw the RS identifying and seizing a rare moment of vulnerability with potentially severe consequences. If RS does not elect new judges in the meantime, not even a Court’s small chamber will be able to operate.</abstract>
  <accessCondition type="use and reproduction">CC BY-SA 4.0</accessCondition>
  <note type="statement of responsibility">Išerić, Harun</note>
  <subject>
    <topic>Bosnia and Herzegovina</topic>
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  <subject>
    <topic>Constitutional Court</topic>
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  <subject>
    <topic>Ethnic Power-sharing</topic>
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  <subject>
    <topic>High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina</topic>
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  <classification authority="ddc" edition="23">342</classification>
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    <identifier type="issn">2366-7044</identifier>
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      <namePart>Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH</namePart>
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  <identifier type="doi">10.17176/20230727-132151-0</identifier>
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