nam 22 uu 4500 10.59704/b3a56c3016f51956 DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 241114s2024||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.59704/b3a56c3016f51956 doi eng 342 23 Hernandez, José Ignacio Author aut An Antidote To Constitutional Authoritarian Populism? - The Constitutional Reform in the Dominican Republic to Constraint President Reelection Hernandez, José Ignacio Verfassungsblog 2024-11-14 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Presidential reelection is once more a focal point in Latin American constitutional law. The amendment to the 2010 Dominican Constitution, approved in October 2024, modifies the presidential term to bar future changes that would permit unlimited presidential reelection. This reform opposes the populist trend that argues for the people’s unconditional right to reelect the incumbent president, as witnessed in Venezuela and Chile. However, as cases like El Salvador demonstrate, constitutional design may be insufficient to deter abusive interpretations by constitutional courts. CC BY-SA 4.0 Authoritarian Populism Authoritarianism Dominican Republic Latin America Presidential Elections Presidential Powers Rechtsstaat Verfassungsrecht (DE-588)4129195-5 gnd Rechtsstaat (DE-588)1175913448 gnd Verfassungsrecht Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://verfassungsblog.de/presidential-reelection-dominican-republic/ raw object