nam 22 uu 4500 10.59704/a5714879f048fed4 DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 240407s2024||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.59704/a5714879f048fed4 doi eng 342 23 Tillin, Louise Author aut Reimagining Indian Federalism Tillin, Louise Verfassungsblog 2024-04-07 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier As India’s new dominant party system coalesced after 2014, the country entered a phase of centralisation. India has always had federalism with a strong centre, but from the late 1980s to the mid-2010s, political and economic regionalism and national coalition governments encompassing national and regional parties produced an appearance of deepening federalisation. Since 2014, when the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) became the first party in over 25 years to win an outright parliamentary majority, the twin pillars of political centralisation under a dominant party system and economic concentration, have once again drawn attention to the contested nature of India’s federal contract. CC BY-SA 4.0 BJP Föderalismus India Indian Constitution federalism (DE-588)4017754-3 gnd Föderalismus Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://verfassungsblog.de/reimagining-indian-federalism/ raw object