nam 22 uu 4500 10.59704/9b1c61a9577c8e19 DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 241120s2024||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.59704/9b1c61a9577c8e19 doi eng 342 23 Santos Cunha, Bruno Author aut Taming the Brazilian Supreme Court - Public Concerns and the Constitutional Implications of Weakening Judicial Review in Brazil Santos Cunha, Bruno Verfassungsblog 2024-11-20 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The recent Proposal for Constitutional Amendment No. 28/2024 weakens constitutional review by allowing Congress to suspend certain decisions of the Supreme Federal Court. This article identifies several exaggerated and premature criticisms present in the public debate. Additionally, it explores how models of weak judicial review, successfully integrated by numerous established democracies, may foster constitutional dialogues and collaboration, potentially reducing counter-majoritarian frictions and enhancing democratic principles. CC BY-SA 4.0 Brasil Brasilien Constitutional Reform The Supreme Federal Court Weak judicial review (DE-588)4008003-1 gnd Brasilien Borges Uliano, André Author aut Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://verfassungsblog.de/taming-the-brazilian-supreme-court/ raw object