nam 22 uu 4500 10.17176/20220930-110554-0 DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 220930s2022||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.17176/20220930-110554-0 doi eng 342 23 Voeten, Erik Author aut The ECtHR’s Coping Strategy - The pitfalls of subsidiarity and deference as strategies to avoid backlash Voeten, Erik Verfassungsblog 2022-09-30 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is operating in an increasingly challenging political and legal environment. Even if member states have stopped short of far-reaching reforms, they have signaled their collective desire for a more restrained Court, starting with the 2012 Brighton Declaration. Governments in established democracies, like the United Kingdom, have refused to implement or dragged-out implementation of ECtHR judgments. In some countries, government officials or major politicians have suggested exiting the Court’s jurisdiction altogether. Finally, several member states have rolled back domestic rights protections for politically unpopular groups, such as criminal defendants, suspected terrorists, asylum seekers, and non-traditional families. CC BY-SA 4.0 coping strategies ECHR ECtHR Subsidiarity Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://verfassungsblog.de/the-ecthrs-coping-strategy/ raw object