The European Union’s Fantastical Constitution - A Response to von Bogdandy and Spieker van den Brink, Martijn Author aut Dawson, Mark Author aut Text xx# 2025 Verfassungsblog 2025-06-27 eng
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 Recently, von Bogdandy and Spieker decided to boldly go where not even they had dared to go before. To overcome the possible Hungarian veto on prolonging EU sanctions against Russia, they propose that the explicit requirement in Article 31(1) TEU for such decisions to be taken by the Council acting unanimously should be overcome on the basis of Article 2 TEU. In their view, a Hungarian veto against further sanctions would violate the value of solidarity and the Hungarian vote should therefore not count. We argue that this would launch us into a whole new, and in our view, dangerous galaxy. CC BY-SA 4.0 van den Brink, Martijn Article 2 TEU EU values European Constitutionalism Hungary 342 https://verfassungsblog.de/the-european-unions-fantastical-constitution/ Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH 10.59704/683c73f664fc9a0b 250627 10.59704/683c73f664fc9a0b Converted from MARCXML to MODS version 3.7 using MARC21slim2MODS3-7.xsl (Revision 1.140 20200717)