nam 22 uu 4500 10.59704/08d9ecb7d74f14a9 DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 240705s2024||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.59704/08d9ecb7d74f14a9 doi eng 342 23 Fluzin, Cyprien Author aut The Limits of Contemporary French Constitutionalism - On France's upcoming institutional instability and possible scenarios after the snap elections Fluzin, Cyprien Verfassungsblog 2024-07-05 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier French President Emmanuel Macron’s dissolution of France’s National Assembly (its lower house of parliament) on June 9th took many by surprise.  The results of the snap election’s first round suggest that Macron’s risky gamble—an attempt at turning the tide after his party suffered a major blow in the European Parliament elections—backfired majestically. However, more than a political setback for Macron, and outside of the many (highly warranted) concerns as to what harmful policies a new far-right-dominated parliament could pass, the move also raises many interesting constitutional law questions. Whatever the outcome of the second round on Sunday, July 7, France will face unprecedented circumstances that are likely to put the country’s 1958 constitution to the test. CC BY-SA 4.0 Authoritarian Populism French Constitution Macron Snap Elections Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://verfassungsblog.de/the-limits-of-contemporary-french-constitutionalism/ raw object