nam 22 uu 4500 10.59704/f602a3daff5a82de DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 260609s2026||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.59704/f602a3daff5a82de doi eng 342 23 Drinóczi, Tímea Author aut The Removal of Key Office Holders - Paradoxes of Constitutional Reconstruction in Hungary Drinóczi, Tímea Verfassungsblog 2026-06-09 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier After the deadline that Prime Minister Péter Magyar set for the key constitutional actors to resign passed, he reiterated the government’s intention to remove them by a single constitutional amendment. They are all Orbán appointees. However, one must first reconcile and overcome the anticipatory obstruction paradox and the procedural self-entrenchment paradox. This goes only while acknowledging that these are in themselves constitutional wrongdoings that must be confronted rather than concealed, and thus subjecting them to the highest possible standards of public justification and deliberation. CC BY-SA 4.0 Magyar Orban Ungarn anticipatory obstruction paradox constitutional amendment key office holders paradox self-entrenchment paradox (DE-588)4078541-5 gnd Ungarn Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://verfassungsblog.de/the-removal-of-key-office-holders/ raw object