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  <titleInfo>
    <title>The Resistance-Deference Paradox - On strategies, survival, and partnership of the Turkish Constitutional Court</title>
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    <namePart>Oder, Bertil Emrah</namePart>
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    <dateIssued encoding="marc">2022</dateIssued>
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    <publisher>Verfassungsblog</publisher>
    <dateIssued>2022-09-28</dateIssued>
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  <abstract displayLabel="Summary">The Turkish Constitutional Court demonstrates the resistance-deference paradox as a pattern in its judicial behavior under autocratic pressure. The docket management strategies including prioritization and late responsiveness are also employed in politically sensitive cases. The deferring stances of the Court legitimize autocratization when core issues of the regime are at stake. In these cases, the Court develops an autocratic partnership that makes itself an unreliable actor without any commitment to judicial ethos. The resistant stances of the Court trigger the political backlash and clashes with the judiciary, leading to further contestation of political autocratization.</abstract>
  <accessCondition type="use and reproduction">CC BY-SA 4.0</accessCondition>
  <note type="statement of responsibility">Oder, Bertil Emrah</note>
  <subject>
    <topic>Constitutional Court</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject>
    <topic>coping strategies</topic>
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  <subject>
    <topic>Turkey</topic>
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  <classification authority="ddc" edition="23">342</classification>
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    <url displayLabel="raw object" usage="primary display">https://verfassungsblog.de/the-resistance-deference-paradox/</url>
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    <identifier type="issn">2366-7044</identifier>
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      <namePart>Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH</namePart>
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  <identifier type="doi">10.17176/20220928-230816-0</identifier>
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