http://dx.doi.org/10.59704/1feab81754e023cf https://verfassungsblog.de/towards-qualified-majority-voting-in-eu-foreign-policy/ Towards Qualified Majority Voting in EU Foreign Policy Goldmann, Matthias Alemanno, Alberto eng 2026-08-19 electronic resource text/html ddc:342 CFSP Hungary Israel Sanctions Unanimity voting Verfassungsblog Verfassungsblog--2366-7044 CC BY-SA 4.0 For several years, the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) appeared to have a Hungary problem. More fundamentally, however, it has a Treaty-design problem. Article 31(1) TEU establishes unanimity as the default decision-making rule for the European Council and the Council in CFSP matters, subject to specified exceptions. We argue that the standard justifications for unanimity do not outweigh its structural costs and that the existing Treaties leave more room for qualified majority vote than current practice suggests.