nam 22 uu 4500 10.59704/1feab81754e023cf DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 260819s2026||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.59704/1feab81754e023cf doi eng 342 23 Goldmann, Matthias Author aut Towards Qualified Majority Voting in EU Foreign Policy Goldmann, Matthias Verfassungsblog 2026-08-19 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier For several years, the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) appeared to have a Hungary problem. More fundamentally, however, it has a Treaty-design problem. Article 31(1) TEU establishes unanimity as the default decision-making rule for the European Council and the Council in CFSP matters, subject to specified exceptions. We argue that the standard justifications for unanimity do not outweigh its structural costs and that the existing Treaties leave more room for qualified majority vote than current practice suggests. CC BY-SA 4.0 CFSP Hungary Israel Sanctions Unanimity voting Alemanno, Alberto Author aut Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://verfassungsblog.de/towards-qualified-majority-voting-in-eu-foreign-policy/ raw object