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  <dc:identifier>http://dx.doi.org/10.59704/d94eecde9a3c4958</dc:identifier>
  <dc:identifier>https://verfassungsblog.de/tunisias-missing-court/</dc:identifier>
  <dc:title>Tunisia’s Missing Court - Applying the Constitution Hill Guidelines in Tunisia</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Fadhel Mahfoudh, Mohamed</dc:creator>
  <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
  <dc:date>2025-09-25</dc:date>
  <dc:type>electronic resource</dc:type>
  <dc:format>text/html</dc:format>
  <dc:subject>ddc:342</dc:subject>
  <dc:subject>democracy</dc:subject>
  <dc:subject>Judiciary</dc:subject>
  <dc:publisher>Verfassungsblog</dc:publisher>
  <dc:relation>Verfassungsblog--2366-7044</dc:relation>
  <dc:rights>CC BY-SA 4.0</dc:rights>
  <dc:description>Public institutions are inherently human and therefore fallible, making constitutions essential as legal guardrails against the abuse of power. Yet constitutional oversight requires not only legal authority but also legitimacy, without which democracies risk repeated crises. In many countries, including Tunisia, this responsibility has been entrusted to constitutional courts. Tunisia’s attempts to establish a fully functioning court – first in 2014, then again in 2022 – highlight the challenges of securing effective and legitimate constitutional oversight.</dc:description>
</dc>
