nam 22 uu 4500 10.17176/20200324-122830-0 DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 200324s2020||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.17176/20200324-122830-0 doi eng 342 23 Nekoliak, Andrii Author aut (orcid)0000-0002-3147-2866 Ukraine’s Presidents and the Judiciary: An Uneasy Relationship Nekoliak, Andrii Verfassungsblog 2020-03-24 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier On March 11, 2020, Ukraine’s Constitutional Court issued a decision dealing with the judicial reform of President Volodymyr Zelensky. The Court cooled down the reformist zeal of the presidential office by proclaiming major changes to the legislation on the judiciary unconstitutional. The Court’s decision strengthens judicial independence in Ukraine which is tainted with the legacy of politicization of past presidencies. CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 constitutional judges Constitutional Law judicial independence Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://verfassungsblog.de/ukraines-presidents-and-the-judiciary-an-uneasy-relationship/ raw object