Israel has long been considered an abolitionist state, having executed only one individual in its history. While past attempts to reinstate the death penalty have proven unsuccessful, the horrendous scale of the October 7 attack and the ensuing traumatic war have been used to generate political momentum. A new bill, which passed its first reading in the Knesset in November 2025, would impose the death penalty for terrorism-related offenses. The bill should be understood as part of a broader capital punishment revivalism trend in populist regimes, with Israel potentially setting a dangerous precedent for attempts to reinstate the death penalty in Europe and beyond.

Instituting the death penalty in Israel

Inheriting the death penalty as a form of punishment from the British Mandate, Israel officially abolished the death penalty for murder in 1954, maintaining it only for exceptional crimes such as the Holocaust, Genocide, and treason. Even though the death penalty has remained on the books for these offenses, Israel has only ever executed one person, Adolf Eichmann, a notorious Nazi general who was among the architects of the Holocaust.

In recent decades, proposals to impose capital punishment on terrorists have been a recurring debate in Israeli politics. Despite a steady popular support for the death penalty for terrorists, the debate had never materialized into a policy change. The security establishment has been among the primary opponents to capital punishment, arguing it would not increase deterrence and would only exacerbate tensions.

Then October 7 happened. While polls conducted weeks after the attack showed no significant change in the public attitude towards the death penalty, right-wing Members of Knesset saw an opportunity in the new political climate, advancing legislation that would impose capital punishment on terrorists. Faced with the possibility that capital punishment might be imposed on Jewish right-wing terrorists, the MKs went to extreme lengths to ensure the penalty would only apply to Palestinian terrorists. Notably, a previous version of the bill was proposed a few months before October 7, yet it appears the war enabled the political climate for its pursuit.

 “No such thing as a Jewish terrorist”

The bill amends the Israeli Criminal Code, stipulating that the death penalty should be a mandatory punishment for whoever

“intentionally or carelessly causes the death of an Israeli citizen, motivated by racism or hatred towards the public […] and with the intention to harm the State of Israel and the existence of the Jewish people in their Land”.

This wording is intended to target exclusively Palestinian terrorism, but not other forms of violence, such as Jewish terrorist activity. Additionally, the bill orders the Israel Defense Forces court system to impose capital punishment on murderers convicted in military courts in the occupied West Bank; only Palestinians are tried in these courts.

The Members of Knesset behind the bill have explicitly expressed their aim of preventing capital punishment from ever applying to Jewish terrorists. MK Limor Son Har-Melech went further, arguing that “there is no such thing as a Jewish terrorist”, disregarding several Jewish convicted terrorists currently serving life sentences in Israeli prisons for the murder of Palestinians. Minister of Finance Smotrich took a different approach, arguing that the law might also apply to Jews, “if there are traitors among us – it applies to them too”. Notably, some in Israel’s security establishment have shifted from their traditional opposition to the death penalty; the new government-appointed Shin Bet Chief, head of Israel’s clandestine antiterrorism service, backs the new bill, arguing it would increase deterrence.

The bill has generated significant pushback both within and outside Israel. Human rights organizations have emphasized the discriminatory framework of the bill, which would create a two-tier system, subjecting only Palestinians to capital punishment. Opposition leaders in Israel have raised similar claims, while also arguing that the bill will lead to more terrorism as vengeance for executions. Jewish religious leaders have opposed the bill too, on the grounds that it would bring “bloodshed”. Some Ultra-Orthodox MKs in the Knesset, in line with directives by Rabbis, have announced they will oppose the bill.

Nevertheless, the bill is moving forward at breakneck speed, with the Minister of National Security, Itamar Ben Gvir, pledging to leave the coalition if the bill does not pass. Members of Ben Gvir’s party recently began wearing a yellow pin in the shape of a hanging noose, attempting to replicate the yellow ribbon that had been worn by supporters of the Israeli hostages’ release. Execution methods are already being discussed, with the Knesset Research Center publishing a survey of execution methods in the US, discussing lethal injection, gas chamber, electric chair, and firing squad.

Another criticism voiced at the bill has come from the right, with some arguing that the law could not be applied retroactively, and thus would not be used against the perpetrators of the October 7 attack. Consequently, a special bill, sponsored by both opposition and coalition MKs and supported by the Justice Minister, is set to facilitate the October 7 trials under Israel’s Genocide law. Currently, it appears that both bills are advanced concurrently: one for the October 7 perpetrators, and the other prospectively for future terrorist attacks.

To become law, the bill still needs to pass a second and third reading in the Knesset, and constitutional petitions are set to challenge its discriminatory framework. The Israeli Association for Civil Rights has already pledged to petition the Supreme Court if the bill is approved, calling the law “cruel, unjust, and racist”. In the past, the Supreme Court had struck down laws that differentiated between Jews and Arabs, yet it is unclear whether the Court will rule that the death penalty law is discriminatory or otherwise abridges the right to Human Dignity. In any event, the Israeli experience might be viewed as a testing ground for other populist regimes contemplating the reintroduction of the death penalty.

Capital punishment in populist regimes

While Israel is spearheading the reintroduction of capital punishment, support for its revival is also present in Europe and beyond. Although the European Charter of Fundamental Rights prohibits the death penalty, and EU institutions regularly reaffirm the Union’s “strong and unequivocal opposition” to the death penalty, populist leaders in Europe routinely voice their support for the reinstatement of the death penalty. A decade ago, Viktor Orban launched a manifesto calling for the reinstatement of the death penalty in Hungary, sparking a clash with EU institutions. While this push went nowhere, Orban is not alone. France’s Marie Le Pen pledged to hold a referendum on reinstituting the death penalty if elected. Usually, calls for the reinstatement of capital punishment follow terrorist attacks or gruesome murderers. A recent murderof an eight-year-old child in Poland brought the Prime Minister, Mateusz Morawiecki, to call for the restoration of the death penalty, with surveys showing that around half of Poles support capital punishment.

Given the EU Charter’s binding nature and other EU regulations, the reintroduction of capital punishment seems unlikely. Nevertheless, populist and quasi-authoritarian regimes in other places are also warming up to the death penalty. In recent months, Kyrgyzstan’s populist government has been considering reinstating capital punishment for crimes such as femicide and child abuse. Kyrgyzstan had previously ratified the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which prohibits capital punishment. The UN High Commissioner on Human Rights called on the country to “halt immediately efforts to reintroduce the death penalty”, warning it would violate international law. In a similar manner, the death penalty has been a recurring issue in the Philippines, with the recently introduced House Bill No. 11211 proposing to institute the death penalty by firing squad for corruption offenses. Likewise, Peru’s President recurrently voices her support of reinstating capital punishment, in a step that might require withdrawal from the American Convention on Human Rights.

The strategy

Capital punishment revivalism serves several goals for populist regimes. At the base level, it is a component of penal populism, a tool for mobilizing the public with “tough on crime” and security-reassuring rhetoric. In this sense, the death penalty is used to garner electoral and public support for the broader policies of the government; for example, Israel is entering an election year, and some view the death penalty as merely an electoral stunt by Ben Gvir’s party.

Moreover, the death penalty can be used to divert attention from the failure of a populist government to deliver on promises to enhance security and reduce crime. Both in Israel and Peru, the death penalty has been introduced in the background of a decline in personal security and rising crime levels. Populist regimes thus introduce capital punishment as a “simple” solution to convoluted threats, such as organized crime and terrorism, instead of pursuing more complicated, and perhaps politically unrewarding, measures to tackle the underlying roots of the problem.

At a deeper level, death penalty reinstatement is an anti-institutional and anti-judiciary tool. Complexity in administering the death penalty, as well as human rights and constitutional considerations, often lead institutional actors to oppose its introduction. As a result, populist regimes pursue the death penalty to undermine the legitimacy and popularity of institutions. Orban used the death penalty as part of his broader feud with EU institutions; similarly, even if the Israeli Supreme Court were to strike down the death penalty bill, the ruling could still be used by the government to further portray the Court as out of touch and illegitimate.

Finally, capital punishment serves a broader goal in escalating state-sanctioned violence to threaten political dissent. While at the start, the death penalty might be introduced to target specific crimes, such as hideous murders or terrorist activity, the often vague definition of “terrorism” could ultimately be used to threaten political opponents. Notably, the death penalty does not need to be widely imposed on dissidents to create a chilling effect on political activity. Instead, the imposition of state-sanctioned violence through executions creates fear of the regime, entrenching theauthoritarian government and quashing political dissent.

Implications

Populist political movements worldwide increasingly incorporate capital punishment revivalism into their agendas. So far, these sentiments have been largely left to rhetoric, and attempts to implement them have been unsuccessful. However, the world now faces several jurisdictions with credible and advanced initiatives to reinstate capital punishment. Capital punishment revivalism demonstrates that populist reforms do not limit themselves to the separation of powers and to narrowly defined anti-democratic issues; punitive “tough on crime” sentiments often accompany these regimes, and capital punishment reinstatement is yet another tool in the populist attack on institutions. With the rise of populist movements and governments worldwide, we should be wary of their impact on the global effort to abolish capital punishment.