Epistemic Authority and the Right to Science in AO-32/25

Among the various legal instruments aimed at protecting human rights in the face of the climate emergency, few require as much interpretative effort as the right to science. Traditionally situated within the realm of programmatic obligations and often associated with promoting technical progress and disseminating scientific information, this right has occupied a marginal place within the contentious and advisory architecture of the Inter-American system. However, in its Advisory Opinion–AO-32/25, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) changes this framework by shifting the right to science from a peripheral tool of knowledge dissemination to a central axis of disputes over epistemic authority in public policy formation. This repositioning is not merely about expanding the scope of an undervalued right but about redefining its legal status based on the structural transformations imposed by the climate crisis on the normative production forms and institutional recognition of knowledge.

Epistemic authority, the right to science and the imperative of epistemic plurality

In AO-32/25, the IACtHR states that the legal content of the right to science necessarily involves the recognition of traditional knowledge systems as legitimate forms of interpretation, diagnosis, and forecasting of climatic dynamics, possessing their own legal relevance in State decision-making processes (paras. 476–485). The exclusion of these systems from State decision-making in climate governance – traditionally classified as “local knowledge,” “cultural practices,” or “empirical experiences” – now constitutes a direct violation of the American Convention on Human Rights. The IACtHR’s mandate to States is not confined to the procedural inclusion of communities holding such knowledge; it involves the effective integration of their epistemologies into the formal mechanisms by which States produce, implement, and oversee climate policies (para. 480).

This new reading of the right to science requires States to reconfigure their normative, methodological, and institutional frameworks to permit the substantive participation of these knowledge systems in public decision-making (para. 483). Traditional knowledge thereby ceases to be a mere object of consultation or representation and acquires the status of a distinct point of reference in assessing the validity of public policies, policies that had previously relied exclusively on conventional technical-scientific epistemologies (para. 483). AO-32/25 reframes the question of what makes a State’s climate actions legitimate. It’s no longer just about whether procedures were followed; it is also about whether the policies are built on a foundation of diverse ways of knowing. This means recognizing Indigenous and local knowledge as equally valid alongside scientific expertise, in line with Article 7.5 of the Paris Agreement, which requires that adaptation be country-driven, participatory, and guided not only by the best available science but also, as appropriate, by traditional knowledge, knowledge of Indigenous peoples, and local knowledge systems. 

Building on this shift in epistemic authority, the IACtHR further anchors its reasoning in a systematic interpretation of Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights, based on Articles 38, 47, and 51 of the Organization of American States Charter and Article 14.2 of the Protocol of San Salvador. From this perspective, the right to science in the climate context is not exhausted by access to academic research or the dissemination of scientific results (para. 476). Rather, it entails the institutional recognition of traditional knowledge systems as qualified expressions of rationality, capable of understanding and responding to climate effects (para. 478). This legal recognition is not contingent on methodological conformity with conventional technical-scientific parameters, but on their capacity to produce consistent observations, analyses, and solutions adapted to specific socio-territorial realities (paras. 479–480).

The IACtHR states that excluding traditional knowledge in the development of public climate policies compromises not only the right to participation but also undermines the very content of the right to science (para. 480). The absence of institutional mechanisms ensuring the effective presence of traditional knowledge forms in decision-making spaces thus constitutes a violation of State obligations under the Inter-American framework, especially in light of the Protocol of San Salvador (para. 477). Such a violation does not require demonstrable material harm – the mere lack of procedural guarantees for the legitimate incorporation of diverse epistemologies in normative formulation suffices.

States must establish structural mechanisms for incorporating multiple knowledge systems into public decision-making (para 483). AO-32/25 does not endorse informal or consultative participation alone; it demands that traditional knowledge have real and effective influence in shaping regulatory content, defining risk parameters, and informing technical decisions in climate matters (para 483). To meet these requirements, States may need to revise their environmental licensing processes, governance structures for the energy transition, legal frameworks for climate adaptation and mitigation, and impact assessment criteria for vulnerable communities, among other things.

The IACtHR employs the term “inter-scientific dialogue” to describe the institutional integration of diverse knowledges within State structures (para. 483). Although the term remains conceptually open, that is, introduced without an exhaustive definition and leaving room for future development, it signals a shift away from a State monopoly of scientific epistemology. In this view, legitimate State action in the context of the climate emergency requires an articulation between different ways of producing knowledge and interpreting the relationship between humans, territory, and climate. This “dialogue” is not merely deliberative; it constitutes a legal imperative for restructuring the epistemic foundations of public authority. 

Epistemic plurality and the redefinition of climate policy metrics

The framework of epistemic plurality articulated by the IACtHR in AO-32/25 also implicitly affects financing instruments, technical indicators, and efficiency protocols adopted in climate mitigation and adaptation policies. The IACtHR warns that the success or failure of these policies cannot be measured solely by metrics such as scalability, traceability, replicability, or cost-benefit (para. 484). Applying only these criteria risks reproducing dynamics of exclusion and epistemic subordination. The IACtHR instead requires States to reinterpret evaluation parameters in light of the criteria defined by localized knowledge systems themselves, including their own conceptions of sustainability, continuity, and effectiveness (para. 484).

Previous IACtHR jurisprudence provides important context. AO-23/17 recognized the indivisibility between environmental rights and human rights, emphasizing participation, access to information, and justice. Cases such as Saramaka v. Suriname, Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, Lhaka Honhat v. Argentina, and La Oroya v. Peru consolidated obligations of consultation, consent, and protection of traditional ways of life. In AO-32/25, the IACtHR uniquely treats traditional knowledge not as cultural manifestations to be protected but as cognitive systems with their own legal authority in decision-making processes (paras. 478–485).

This conceptual redesign has important implications for State obligations concerning science and climate. The duty to respect the right to science implies abstaining from any policy that subjects traditional knowledge to a lower epistemic hierarchy than other forms of knowledge (para. 480). In turn, the duty to guarantee the right to science entails adopting institutional mechanisms that enable the coexistence and co-production of knowledge, including through the protection of territories, languages, oral transmission, spiritual practices, and Indigenous methods of climatic observation, as essential components of those knowledge systems (paras. 482–484). The duty of progressive development requires States to continuously adapt their legal and policy frameworks to reflect the plurality of epistemologies present within their jurisdiction and ensure their effective participation in environmental and climate decision-making (para. 481).

The IACtHR further affirms that States must preserve the integrity of traditional knowledge systems by ensuring their protection from forms of reductionism, including policies that treat them as symbolic cultural elements rather than living epistemologies. This includes adopting intercultural approaches that respect their internal logic and preventing their displacement by technocratic procedures that fail to recognize their relevance and legitimacy (paras. 480, 483–484). This point endows with legal significance an aspect frequently neglected by climate policies: the cognitive vulnerability of traditional peoples faced with decision-making processes operating under a single epistemology, disguised as neutrality or “best available evidence.”

Conclusion

The content of AO-32/25 therefore represents a material transformation of climate legality in the Inter-American System. By recognizing that traditional knowledge systems are part of the content of the right to science, the IACtHR sets precise parameters for reviewing States’ institutional practices and imposes a duty to revise legal frameworks in light of the epistemic diversity of territories under their jurisdiction (paras. 476–485). Cognitive authority, previously restricted to centralized technical-scientific institutions, is now reformulated to include traditional knowledge.