Amid a global wave of democratic backsliding, some States managed to reverse the erosion of their democracy. For Guatemala, the 2023 presidential election marked a turning point: The pro-democratic presidential candidate Bernardo Arévalo of the Semilla party surprisingly won and formed a new government (see Schwartz). However, authoritarian forces continue to pressure the newly elected government to this day, most notably by prosecuting pro-democratic actors. In light of this pressure, Guatemala’s pro-democratic government requested an advisory opinion on the protection of democracy and political rights from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR/the Court). This week, from 17 to 20 March 2026, the IACtHR will convene the public hearings concerning the request, for which 125 written observations have been submitted.

While scholars have already analysed Guatemala’s arguments concerning a right to democracy (Amor Vázquez, Cabrera Silva, García Escobar, and, more broadly, Lima), I focus on the purpose of Guatemala’s request: I argue that Guatemala’s pro-democratic government turned to international law to generate resources for its domestic struggle against national authoritarian forces. In response, the IACtHR can assist pro-democratic actors in Guatemala and throughout the region by clearly and authoritatively spelling out the obligations of States concerning the protection of democracy.

A resource for protecting democracy

In her 2023 Grotius Lecture, “Restoring Democracy Through International Law”, Kim Lane Scheppele argues that international law provides a resource for national actors that aim to defend or restore democracy. During the current wave of democratic backsliding, autocrats entrench their rule by changing national laws and by capturing national institutions. Even once autocrats lose power, they have ensured that successors remain unable to change national law, and captured institutions continue to push back against pro-democratic actors. International law, however, remains outside of the (unilateral) reach of autocrats. Moreover, when national institutions are captured, international courts may remain as the only independent arbitrator (see Abebe and Landau). Consequently, international law can serve as a resource for pro-democratic actors in cases of democratic backsliding. National actors can use it to prevent autocrats from capturing domestic institutions, to restore co-opted institutions once they have been captured, and to replace national laws that entrench authoritarian rule (see Cepeda Espinosa’s summary of Scheppele’s Grotius Lecture).

To illustrate the potential impact of international law, Ginsburg employed Scheppele’s metaphor of a three-dimensional chess game: In a contestation over democracy, actors can make a move at the national level, the international level, or at both levels simultaneously. Thereby, national actors can use international law, either to support actions on the national level or to overcome obstacles. Ideally, international law guides national actors that are willing to comply with it. If autocrats have ensured that successors are unable to change national law, international law may enable such changes, for example because the national legal system grants it primacy over national law or because it is used as a justification for breaching national law (see Scheppele).

Additionally, international law can also have an impact if it does not lead to compliance. For instance, in Europe, international law provided important arguments to the Polish opposition in their 2023 electoral bid against the authoritarian PiS government. In the African system, opposition parties and other national actors use litigation before Africa’s international courts to mobilize support against authoritarian malpractice (see Gathii). For the inter-American system, von Bogdandy and Urueña showed that regional international law, as well as an IACtHR advisory opinion, can shape the actions and interactions of politicians, judges, NGOs, the electorate, and other national and transnational actors. In this vein, Cabrera Silva predicts that “the [IACtHR’s] response to Guatemala’s request will reshape how regional institutions and advocacy networks confront ongoing democratic erosion”.

Requesting new pro-democratic resources

In the request, Guatemala explicitly acknowledges that it aims to consolidate democracy in the region (para. 4 of the request). It further underscores that “Inter-American standards and their application represent an essential tool for States […] to adopt preventive measures in face of the several risks that democracy faces in the region” (para. 10). On this basis, Guatemala concludes that a pronouncement of clear standards by the IACtHR would provide a genuine answer to rising authoritarianism on the continent (para. 154).

Two examples from the request illustrate that Guatemala’s pro-democratic government aims to generate these resources for its own domestic struggle against national authoritarian forces. Firstly, Guatemala requests the Court to clarify the legal standards concerning the registration and cancellation of political parties (para. 41) and the banning of political parties and candidates (paras. 70, 72). These questions reflect the attacks that authoritarian actors mounted against the Semilla Party of President Arévalo: After the first round of the 2023 presidential election, the Guatemalan Public Prosecutor’s Office started efforts to suspend Semilla in order to prevent Arévalo from participating in the electoral runoffs. Although these efforts initially remained unsuccessful, Semilla’s party status was suspended and cancelled after Arévalo won the runoff (for an overview, see Schwartz and Villagrán Sandoval). Since Guatemala’s questions regard the cancellation and banning of political parties, an IACtHR advisory opinion could provide resources for the ongoing domestic struggle over Semilla’s party status. Moreover, the request explicitly points to the risk of abusive decisions and “lawfare” (sic!) directed against political parties (paras. 74, 143, 148). These considerations are reminiscent of the attacks mounted against Semilla.

Secondly, Guatemala asks the Court whether the inter-American system guarantees the independence of electoral management bodies and how electoral management bodies and their personnel must be protected (paras. 39, 93-104), explicitly mentioning its Supreme Electoral Tribunal (para. 101). The questions also reflect the role of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal in Guatemala’s struggle between authoritarian and pro-democratic forces. On the one hand, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal played a major role in excluding presidential candidates from the 2023 presidential election and in suspending the Semilla Party. On the other hand, the Tribunal and its members became subject to attacks by the Public Prosecutor’s Office after they certified Arévalo’s win in the 2023 presidential election (see Schwartz and Villagrán Sandoval). Guatemala’s questions on the independence and protection of electoral management bodies capture both of these issues. Consequently, any pronouncement by the IACtHR may provide important resources to national actors in Guatemala.

This is also implicitly supported by the written observations of Guatemala’s Constitutional Court. In contrast to Guatemala’s government, it argued that the IACtHR should reject the request for an advisory opinion, among others, to avoid it being used to obtain a premature ruling on issues that could give rise to contentious proceedings (see more generally concerning admissibility OC 25/18, paras. 46-47; Benz). However, Guatemala’s pro-democratic government is not only concerned with its own domestic struggle against authoritarian forces. Rather, the request regularly points to the aim of developing resources for the region as a whole (see for example paras. 4, 10, 154, all cited above). Moreover, it engages with the situation in other States of the region (see e.g. paras. 5-15). For example, Guatemala justifies its questions on electoral management bodies by comparing the design of different electoral management bodies throughout the region (paras. 99-100). These questions are relevant to many States because electoral management bodies are among the institutions most often attacked during democratic backsliding.

In general, the request points to some of the most pressing issues regarding democratic backsliding since many examples provided by Guatemala resemble backsliding cases throughout the world (see for example para. 67 referring to “repressive decrees and laws, excessive use of force, protest repression, censorship and media control, manipulation of the justice system, etc.”). Thereby, the request provides the Court with an opportunity to generate resources for pro-democratic actors in Guatemala and the region as a whole.

International courts protecting democracy

International courts have regularly stepped up to protect democracy, for example by elaborating on the scope of political rights. In response to democratic backsliding, regional organisations and their courts have also started to develop international legal standards concerning domestic institutions. International courts adjudicated on the independence of the judiciary, electoral management bodies, and even national parliaments(for an overview see Ginsburg and Scheppele). Doctrinally, these institutional standards exist because treaties explicitly prescribe them (e.g. Art 17(2)(1) African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance) or because human rights necessitate certain institutional structures as a prerequisite for the enjoyment of individual rights.

The IACtHR forms an important part of this broader trend. In 2021, the Court stated in reaction to democratic backsliding that “the effective exercise of democracy in the States of the Americas constitutes an international legal obligation” (OC 28/21, para. 55). This follows from a combination of multiple instruments and provisions which recognise democracy as a fundamental and indispensable principle of the inter-American system (ibid., paras. 43-54). These include the preamble of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), the preamble and Art. 2(b), 3(d) of the Charter of the Organisation of American States (OAS), and the Inter-American Democratic Charter (ibid.). Art. 1(1) of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, a resolution of the OAS General Assembly, even states that the peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it.

In addition, the IACtHR has used human rights to spell out the international legal obligations of States on many issues connected to democracy, such as judicial independence, the impunity of authoritarian actors, freedom of the press, and the electoral process, including presidential term limits (see Cepeda Espinosa and Lima). The Court also elaborated on the institutional structure of States: In 2024, it relied on Articles 23, 24, 13 and 8(1) ACHR to pronounce, inter alia, that electoral management bodies must be impartial, independent and transparent (see Capriles v. Venezuela, para. 107; Gadea Mantilla v. Nicaragua, paras. 88, 116). In its reasoning, the Court stressed that national rules concerning a State’s political system

“must be compatible with the American Convention and, therefore, with the principles of representative democracy that underpin the inter-American system, including those derived from the Inter-American Democratic Charter.” (OC 28/21, para. 86; see also Capriles v. Venezuela, para. 106; Gadea Mantilla v. Nicaragua, para. 86).

Only within these confines, a State remains free to choose its political system in accordance with its historical, political, social, and cultural needs (ibid.). Consequently, the IACtHR can provide resources for protecting democracy by clearly and authoritatively spelling out the obligations of States under international law and regional human rights law.

A chance to protect democracy through international law

In the end, international law alone cannot protect democracy. While international support can be important, the fate of democracy is ultimately decided at the domestic level. It depends on national elections, national institutions, and the actions of national actors, such as State officials, opposition figures, and civil society (for Guatemala, see Schwartz). Yet, international law can form part of a toolbox that enables national actors to defend and restore democracy. In this light, the most productive thing international lawyers can do is develop new resources for the protection of democracy. Guatemala has explicitly requested such resources from the IACtHR. It is now upon the Court to provide them.