“It looks more like a managed transition than a revolution.”
Five Questions to Michael Meyer-Resende
Syria is facing massive political upheaval after the fall of dictator Bashar al-Assad. What might a post-Assad state look like? How do questions of transitional justice relate to building a functioning state? And what role will international actors play in the political transition process in the months ahead? We spoke with Michael Meyer-Resende, Executive Director of “Democracy Reporting International” (DRI), an international NGO headquartered in Berlin that has extensively supported constitutional reform processes in the Middle East and North Africa.
1. After the fall of the Assad regime, global attention is now focused on the country’s political future. In the past, international legal advisors have often been quick to propose grand concepts such as federalism or presidential/parliamentary democracy following major state upheavals. Is this a good idea in the case of Syria?
First of all, I hope that such questions will come into play and that the country does not descend into another civil war. That remains uncertain. I am not a cynic who says, “This will never work.” Iraq, for example, has somewhat stabilized in recent years despite many expectations to the contrary. But this is, of course, not a given in Syria.
Anyone who wants to support a peaceful process must understand that negotiating political solutions is an extremely sensitive process. It should be supported, but in a careful and respectful manner. Syrians must deliberate and make decisions themselves. International organizations and NGOs can help ensure that they receive good comparative information. This often includes Syrians who work on these issues within international organizations and NGOs.
Unfortunately, however, foreign observers are often quick to propose simplistic solutions. Syria is a relatively large and highly heterogeneous country that fears concentrated power? Then federalism must be the ideal solution! Such contributions are counterproductive. Labels like federalism often evoke different associations than we might imagine. Federalism, for example, often has the reputation of being a precursor to state collapse, raising fears of the secession of federal states. A term like federalism can immediately harden negotiations.
In short, Syrians must negotiate what kind of state they want to have. What powers should be vested at what level and in which institution? It is not important how solutions they find might be labelled. What matters is that all relevant groups are involved and that there are viable, functioning compromises that have broad support.
2. Syria has had a new constitution since 2012, but its content and drafting process were sharply criticized by opposition groups. Does this constitution play a role in the country’s political future, or will the priority now be to quickly initiate a new constitutional drafting process?
In 2012, Assad drafted a new constitution in the context of the rebellion. It was meant to appear as a concession to the people but it further expanded his power. The referendum on the constitution was widely boycotted.
The Syrian opposition demands the drafting of a new constitution. Interestingly, the new Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) government currently gives the impression of a managed transition rather than a revolution. It recently announced that it would “suspend” the constitution and parliament for three months, with a committee tasked with reviewing how the constitution can be adapted.
I believe we are at a crossroads: either the new government will adjust the constitution executively (and possibly attempt to quickly legitimize it through a referendum), or it will use the three months to outline a more nuanced reform process that involves all relevant groups and includes the drafting of a new constitution.
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3. You mentioned that we are observing more of a managed transition than a revolution. What role does institutional, and to some extent, personnel continuity play in transitions like the one in Syria?
In Syria, the Iraqi catastrophe following the U.S. invasion looms large. The Bush administration’s decision to dissolve state institutions triggered the collapse of the state. In the Idlib zone, HTS secured support largely by ensuring that the zone functioned administratively and economically to a reasonable degree. It achieved a kind of “output legitimacy” there.
It is possible that HTS views the issue of continuity pragmatically, leaning toward the mentioned “executive solution.” On the other hand, it has also announced that “all those who have committed crimes against the Syrian people will be prosecuted under the law.”
It remains unclear what this means. If interpreted broadly, many soldiers and officials from the Assad regime could be prosecuted. If interpreted narrowly, only high-ranking individuals might be targeted.
4. In the narrowly interpreted case, isn’t there a tension with issues of transitional justice—that is, addressing the injustices and atrocities committed during the dictatorship?
Yes, this tension is very strong and always exists when dictatorships fall. On the one hand, there is a need to maintain the functionality of the state; prosecuting many soldiers and officials could weaken that functionality. The destruction in Syria is immense—half the population has been displaced. If ever a functioning and pragmatic state was needed, it is now.
On the other hand, the Assad regime was among the most brutal governments in existence. There is now extensive reporting on the Saidnaya prison, which has long been a nightmare for Syrians. This slaughterhouse is just the tip of the iceberg of a heinous regime.
As outsiders, it is hard to offer advice here. Who are we to tell Syrians whose families and friends were tortured and murdered that they should forgo justice? Only Syrians can negotiate this among themselves. How far do they want to go with prosecutions? Should they address the issue through non-criminal institutions like truth commissions?
However, morality is not solely on the side of justice. The functionality of the state and its ability to solve problems also carries a moral dimension.
5. Let’s briefly touch on international law and geopolitical interests in the region. Some states have proposed basing the political transition process on UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which outlined initial elements for a political process after the civil war. What is this resolution about, and could it play a role in the power transition in Syria?
Since the Assad regime violently suppressed protests and the situation escalated into a civil war, the United Nations and many states have made intensive peace efforts. I have rarely seen such sustained efforts, including numerous studies and proposals on what a new Syrian state could look like, many of which were developed by Syrian experts. This could now be an advantage if the HTS government opens up to them.
Until 2016, there was hope for an agreement between the regime and the opposition. UN Resolution 2254 provided a legal framework for those talks. However, at its core, the resolution is now obsolete, as it no longer aligns with current circumstances. It was intended to broker peace between the regime and the opposition. The regime no longer exists as an organized force, rendering that part of the resolution irrelevant. Nevertheless, the resolution retains some relevance, as it establishes key pillars for a potential process. This is reflected in yesterday’s G7 declaration, which pledged full support for an “inclusive Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition process” in the spirit of UN Resolution 2254.
Foreign actors must act with sensitivity but should also articulate their positions and interests. Take Germany as an example: Germany has provided immense support to Syrians in need (and also benefited, considering issues like brain drain and addressing labor shortages). The German judiciary decided the first-ever case related to state torture in Syria (the “Koblenz case”). Over a million people in Germany are either Syrian or of Syrian descent.
The situation in Syria directly affects us. Therefore, Germany has the right to demand something from the new government—primarily an inclusive process. The German government should insist on this and make its support for reconstruction conditional upon it.
It is positive if the new government wants to solve problems quickly, but it must also dedicate time and energy to involving all major Syrian groups in the reform process. This type of “input legitimacy” is crucial for long-term stability, especially regarding sensitive issues like state structure and individual rights.
What is needed now is not megaphone diplomacy but rather dialogue with the government and all other groups.
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Editor’s Pick
by ANJA BOSSOW
The Wind Knows My Name by Isabel Allende weaves together the stories of two children—one in 1938 Europe and the other in present-day America—whose lives are shaped by the trauma of family separation. At the age of 4, Samuel, a musically gifted Jewish boy from Vienna, is put on the Kindertransport to England by his mother in a desperate attempt to save him from the Nazis. In 2019, Anita, a young, blind girl from El Salvador, is forcibly separated from her mother after they seek refuge in the United States. Allende artfully connects these two historical episodes to capture the cruelty and emotional trauma that experiences of flight and loss inflict, all while honoring the resilience, resistance and compassion that persist in the face of state-sanctioned violence.
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The Week on Verfassungsblog
…summarized by MAXIM BÖNNEMANN
In an unprecedented decision, the Romanian Constitutional Court annulled the first round of the presidential elections. The decision has sent shock waves through Romania and Europe, and it does not only have domestic implications but potentially also geopolitical dimensions. The court’s intervention was prompted by evidence of Russian interference in the electoral process and campaign, including through TikTok. There are therefore many reasons to make the events in Romania a focal point here as well – and that is precisely what we have done:
BIANCA SELEJAN-GUTAN (ENG) explains the broader context of the presidential elections and the previous interventions of the Constitutional Court regarding the electoral procedure and outlines possible lessons from the ruling. MILES R. MAFTEAN (ENG) argues that the case reveals a lot about the shifting nature of threats to democracy. Traditionally, militant democracy has been a tool to counter domestic dangers like extremist parties or authoritarian movements. However, in the Romanian case, a transnational web of manipulation has been uncovered, demonstrating how democratic self-defense must contend with threats that transcend boundaries. CSONGOR KUTI (ENG) offers a more critical perspective: While the Constitutional Court may have momentarily saved Romania’s fragile democracy, the expansion of its review powers could just as easily turn against the democratic establishment in the future. ALINA CARROZZINI (ENG) argues that the Court’s decision is a last-resort attempt to prevent a further decline in the rule of law in Romania. Yet, its modalities, timing, and face value are such that it risks shooting Romanian democracy in the foot. The gravity of the interference in Romania’s elections implied a need to intervene quickly, but in the long run, the decision could prove counterproductive.
While the German Supply Chain Act faces criticism for its potential economic impact, compliance offers companies significant advantages. SARAH MASOUD (ENG) argues that amending or repealing the German Supply Chain Act risks diminishing these advantages for German businesses.
On December 4th, the French National Assembly passed a motion of no confidence against Prime Minister Michel Barnier’s government. The very passage of this motion places the government into caretaker status, which considerably restricts its legal authority. MATHIEU CARPENTIER (ENG) explains how this legal situation presents acute challenges for the two budget-related bills currently pending in Parliament since both bills must be passed before December 31st.
Almost immediately after the fall of the Assad dictatorship, German politics began discussing forced returns to Syria. However, legally and practically, the situation is more complex than some suggest. DANIEL THYM (GER) outlines the legal framework of the current discussion.
AGNE LIMANTÉ and YULIIA MOSKVYTYN (ENG) examine Ukraine’s recent steps toward AI integration in the courts, highlighting initiatives and plans for the future. While these efforts reflect a growing recognition of AI’s potential, they also reveal limitations. Concerns surrounding AI, such as data security and confidentiality, reliability, transparency, explainability, accountability, fairness, and bias, are just as significant in judicial contexts as they are in other areas.
In Croatia, a conflict between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Croatian Anti-Corruption Bureau is escalating. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office is now accusing Croatia of systematic rule of law deficiencies. TIM HUYENG and SINAN KURT (GER) highlight that the Croatian population increasingly views the EU as a guarantor of the Croatian rule of law.
While all eyes were recently on the COP 29 climate conference in the context of the climate crisis, another event received less attention: In November, the governments of Costa Rica, Iceland, New Zealand, and Switzerland signed the “Agreement on Climate Change, Trade, and Sustainability” (ACCTS). JELENA BÄUMLER (GER) explains why this is not just another free trade agreement. Rather, it could establish a completely new type of agreement, as the accord pioneers and demonstrates mechanisms that could transition trade law into a new era of sustainability law.
The AfD is also increasingly represented in local councils. The party tries to present itself as a caretaker party while simultaneously playing a significant role in damaging public discourse. This poses a serious threat to democracy and a diverse society, observe ANNA-SOPHIE HEINZE and BENJAMIN HÖHNE (GER).
On Thursday, the Thuringian state parliament elected its prime minister. After both the election in 2020 and the inaugural session in September were hijacked by the far-right AfD, many looked to Erfurt with concern. So did JULIANA TALG, ANNA-MIRA BRANDAU, FRIEDRICH ZILLESSEN and JANNIK JASCHINSKI (GER) analysing the various possible scenarios in advance – in particular whether or not Mario Voigt should accept being elected by AfD votes. Fortunately, the minority coalition was able to reach an agreement with the Left Party at the last minute.
Neues Blog Debate: The EU AI Act’s Impact on Security Law
Perhaps you have already noticed: For some time now, public security law and criminal law have been much more prominently featured with us. The reason for this is a new collaboration with the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Crime, Security, and Law, which we are particularly excited about. A few weeks ago, we launched our new thematic page VB Security and Crime within this framework. This week, we have started an entire symposium with the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Crime, Security, and Law on the topic of the impact of the European AI Act on security law. No doubt: There is much to discuss. Where? Here!
And finally, if you would like to give us happy a small pre-christmas gift: Press this button.
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That’s it for this week! Take care and all the best.
Yours,
the Verfassungsblog Editorial Team
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