On 15th March 2026, Kazakhstan will hold a nationwide referendum in which voters will decide whether to adopt a new Constitution proposed by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. The proposed Constitution marks a significant departure from the current 1995 one: amendments affect 77 articles, or over 80% of the current Constitution. The official reason for the amendments is to move away from consolidated presidential governance; however, the proposed Constitution might have the opposite effect.

Kazakhstan’s democratic rise…

Kazakhstan is the ninth-largest country in the world by area and is situated in Central Asia. It gained independence from the USSR on 16 December 1991. According to data from the International Monetary Fund,Kazakhstan surpassed China in 2025 in GDP per capita growth, establishing itself not only as the most economically prosperous country in Central Asia but also as a steadily growing economy globally. Kazakhstan also showed consistent growth in the Human Development Index (HDI), as evaluated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), with an increase of 21.5 per cent (from 0.689 to 0.837) between 1990 and 2023, and has been recognised for its forward-looking stance in education, the economy, technology, and finance.

Tokayev’s accession to the presidency in 2019 followed nearly three decades of rule by Nursultan Nazarbayev, during which the 1993 Constitution was amended in 1995 to entrench an ultra-presidential republic. Tokayev’s presidency was seen as a departure from old-elite politics and offered a democratic promise, not only because he positioned himself as a leader of a “new” and “just” Kazakhstan, but also because of his substantial experience in office. In addition to his diplomatic and political background – including two terms as foreign minister (1994-1999; 2002-2007) – Tokayev promoted Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy and pursued nuclear disarmament. He held high-level positions and led efforts to secure Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of various regional and intergovernmental organisations, managing complex relationships among competing interests within and outside the region. Tokayev’s rise appeared to signal a break from the tradition of non-democratic leadership, but that promise was short-lived.

… and fall

The bloody January events of 2022 discredited the myth of new democratic governance when police fired on unarmed protesters, killing over 200 people. Not only were the protests violently suppressed, but investigations into the deaths and abuse of power were inadequately carried out; victims continue to seek justice to this day. The promise of “Zhana” (“new” – open and democratic) Kazakhstan under Tokayev’s leadership was also halted by the ongoing suppression of women’s and LGBTQ+ rights, as well as freedom of expression and assembly, despite efforts by civil society and mass mobilisation from the ground. The disconnect between the people’s needs and the leadership persists, as the new amendments to the Constitution highlight.

Outside of domestic politics, Kazakhstan follows regional legal trends. Kyrgyzstan, for example, adopted a unicameral parliament – called Kurultai – in a 2003 referendum. In 2023, Turkmenistan also transitioned from a bicameral to a unicameral model. In Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, parliaments remain bicameral, but the ongoing experiments between unicameral and bicameral systems have been prominent across the region since independence.

The amendments

According to the government’s official press release, the draft was compiled by the Constitutional Commission appointed by presidential decree. The Commission consists of 130 members and includes representatives of Parliament, prominent human rights officials, state agencies, the media, regional bodies, and academics and experts. This composition is overambitiously claimed to include “absolutely all social groups and regions of Kazakhstan.” It is stated that the draft Constitution received over 10,000 responses from the public through the state’s online portal; however, these were not published openly, with no explanation of how they were incorporated, if at all.

According to President Tokayev, the political system needs modernisation to reflect recent political and socio-economic realities, which differ from those that existed when the current Constitution was adopted, when the country was recovering after independence. The amendments were introduced by presidential decree, with the nationwide referendum posing the following question: “Do you accept the new Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the draft of which was published in the media on 12 February 2026?” Despite the claims to look forward, the amendments themselves appear to be a step back from what was achieved.

From bicameral to unicameral parliament

One of the main proposed changes is to transform the Parliament from bicameral to unicameral, renaming it the Kurultai (see Section IV of the proposed Constitution). It would consist of 145 members, serving five-year terms, elected based on proportional representation. The Kurultai would hold legislative powers, while, alarmingly, the President’s bills would have priority for reading and adoption at the Kurultai and would need to be passed within two months. Furthermore, the draft does not specify whether Parliament is responsible for adopting and amending the state budget.

The transition from a bicameral to a unicameral parliament is said to improve representation and the qualifications of members, and to enable greater accountability to the public. Yet the draft does not specify how this would be accomplished. Typically, the Second Chamber of Parliament offers checks on the other chamber by scrutinising and challenging its proposals and providing legislative review and oversight. While it is ultimately up to the states to determine the most suitable form of governance, the oversight functions of bicameral parliaments are particularly valuable in states where one party tends to dominate (as was historically the case in Kazakhstan with Amanat party, previously Nur Otan), where the presidential authority is already strong, or when it is necessary to protect minority rights and prevent hasty decision-making.

Consolidation of presidential powers

Some of the proposed amendments now specify that the President may dismiss the Prosecutor General, the Chairperson of the Supreme Court, and the Human Rights Ombudsman (Article 46(5)). By their very nature, these roles often involve scrutinising and criticising state institutions, which could be problematic since appointments are made by the President rather than the elected parliament. It also proposes a wider range of grounds for the President to dissolve Parliament (Article 46). The move to consolidate power in the new Constitution codifies the President’s entrenched powers, making reform and accountability increasingly difficult.

The status of international law

Under the current Constitution, international treaties ratified by authorised representatives take precedence over other laws (Article 4(3)). The proposed draft states that other normative acts determine the status of international law (Article 5), introducing a significant change that puts international law in a state of limbo regarding its hierarchy. It points to the uncertainty surrounding the enforcement of international obligations and to a changing attitude towards the international legal order, in which Kazakhstan actively participated.

Human rights

The new Constitution would also amend individual and collective rights. For example, the proposed draft now includes a definition of marriage: “a voluntary and equal union between men and women, registered by the state.” The specification of “men and women” reflects restrictions on LGBTQ+ rights, also in a recently introduced legislation prohibiting LGBTQ+ “propaganda.”

The wording regarding the right to free education and medical care has shifted from “free” to “they do not need to pay for it themselves” (Articles 33 and 32). The right to freedom of assembly now applies solely to peaceful gatherings and is subject to broader restrictions, such as those that safeguard public morals (Article 34). The article on freedom of speech and expression also includes an expanded list of limitations, such as harming the reputation and honour of others and public morals (Article 23). The protection of personal data and private life is explicitly extended to the digital realm (Article 21). While limitations are common for rights that are not absolute by nature, the wording surrounding them and the perceived ambiguity could unfairly favour state bodies over individuals and groups.

Economic dimensions

The financing of political parties by foreign citizens is already banned; in the new draft, this ban is strengthened by requiring non-governmental and non-commercial organisations to openly disclose their funding sources, including foreign donors (Article 6(5)). Existing legal provisions mandate that non-commercial organisations report foreign income. This step marks a move, now at the constitutional level, towards greater state control over non-governmental organisations, which could adversely affect their operations and independence, particularly for human rights and rule-of-law organisations that act as impartial watchdogs over state institutions.

Consolidation of sovereignty and new roles and bodies

The new draft emphasises territorial integrity and sovereignty, highlighting that the population is the sole bearer of both state power and sovereignty. The provisions on “Just Kazakhstan” and the primacy of “the Rule of Law” are now included in the preamble, which also references care for nature and the environment. A newly proposed governing body in the draft, the People’s Council of Kazakhstan (Kazakhstan Halyk Kenesi), would represent the interests of the people. The People’s Council is a “consultative” body comprising Kazakh citizens that offers suggestions and recommendations on domestic policy by submitting bills to the Kurultai and calling for nationwide referendums (Section VI). The proposed Constitution states that it serves as a platform for dialogue among citizens, selected by a separate “constitutional law,” though it does not specify how members and the Chairperson are chosen. Another new role, not in place since 1996, is the Vice-President, who would be appointed by the President with the Kurultai’s approval and act as a liaison between the President, parliament, and government.

Procedural aspects

For the new Constitution to be adopted, more than half of the eligible voting population of over 12 million must vote in favour. According to the latest poll by Kazakhstan’s Institute of Public Development, in which 1,200 randomly selected citizens across regions participated, 89.2% support the proposed Constitution (with 52.8% supporting it entirely, 36.4% supporting it mostly, and 10.8% undecided). The survey also indicated a relatively high level of awareness about the referendum – 81.8% are aware of it, and 72.8% plan to take part.

The referendum does not permit voting on individual sections of the amendments; it only allows for acceptance or rejection of the entire package. The scope of the proposed amendments and the extent of the changes involved would require a longer timeframe than the four weeks offered, more thorough scrutiny and public debate, and a more nuanced approach than a simple “yes” or “no” question.

Outlook

If the new constitution is adopted, it would enter into force on 1 July 2026, ending the current parliament. Elections for the new unicameral parliament, the Kurultai, would need to be held hastily within two months. After its first session, the President would appoint key roles, including the Vice-President, the Chairperson, and judges of the Constitutional Court, members of the Central Electoral Committee, and members of the Upper Auditory Chamber, all within two months.

The new Constitution marks a key step in reshaping Kazakhstan’s political system and its regional and international standing. With few constitutional constraints, Kazakhstan moves towards a formal hybrid governance model, aligning with a broader regional trend of institutional experiments that stabilise political leadership rather than transfer and redistribute power. What is at stake is not only an institutional change but also a new political direction, with the presidential authority playing a coordinating role while weakening the legislative body and the scrutiny it provides. It also signals a shift in approach to regional and international relations in both economic and human rights matters. The amendments – both in substance and in how they were proposed and voted on – offer little hope for just and democratic governance.