What Nawrocki’s Victory Means for Europe
On June 1st, Polish voters rendered a fateful decision in the presidential election. Karol Nawrocki, a former hooligan and a historian with no prior political experience and the candidate of the right-wing Law and Justice party (PiS), narrowly defeated Rafał Trzaskowski, the pro-European mayor of Warsaw supported by Donald Tusk’s Civic Coalition, securing 50.89% of the vote to Trzaskowski’s 49.11%. Nawrocki’s victory carries profound implications for Poland’s domestic trajectory, where hopes for reforms such as liberalising the draconian abortion law, recognising partnerships for LGBTQ+ couples, or restoring judicial independence have now dimmed. Moreover, despite what some commentators have argued, the new president might well pose a threat for the European Union. As the EU grapples with the erosion of its longstanding transatlantic alliance, Russia’s war against Ukraine, and the resurgence of populism, it has now witnessed the first electoral triumph within its borders of a leader closely aligned with the MEGA (Make Europe Great Again) movement.
Presidential competences in poland: guardian or gatekeeper?
Under the Polish Constitution of 1997, the President is vested with significant yet primarily balancing powers within the constitutional framework. While the President does not conduct day-to-day governance, they hold critical veto power over legislation (Article 122(5)), requiring a three-fifths majority of votes in the presence of at least half of all deputies in the Sejm to override (Article 122(5)). The President also has the right to initiate constitutional review by referring statutes to the Constitutional Tribunal before signing them into law (Article 122(3)). Furthermore, the President exercises influence over the judiciary appointing judges to the Supreme Court, Constitutional Tribunal (on his own motion for the latter), and other courts on the motion of the National Council of the Judiciary (Articles 179, 194(1)).
In foreign policy, while the Council of Ministers leads negotiations (Article 146(4)(9)), the President ratifies and denounces international agreements (Article 133(1)(1)) and represents Poland in international relations (Article 133). Critically, the President serves as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Article 134(1)) and can introduce a state of emergency in specific circumstances (Article 230). These competences grant the President some degree of power over both domestic and foreign affairs, from shaping judicial appointments to influencing the country’s international relations. In matters of foreign policy, the President’s powers to ratify international agreements and represent Poland abroad provide a platform to assert strategic narratives and influence the country’s stance within the European Union and NATO, especially in periods of political polarisation. Notably, the President possesses the authority to veto legislation, including bills aimed at implementing EU law. Furthermore, the President leads Poland’s delegation at NATO summits, participating in discussions that shape the alliance’s directions.
Exporting Populism
Nawrocki’s ascent has been facilitated, in no small part, by overt support from Donald Trump and his entourage – an emerging pattern of American right-wing involvement in European electoral politics. In May, Nawrocki travelled to Washington, where a photograph alongside Trump in the Oval Office was widely interpreted as a de facto endorsement. Just days before the election, Poland hosted its first-ever Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), at which U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem offered further support, proclaiming: “Donald Trump is a strong leader for us, but you have an opportunity to have just as strong of a leader in Karol if you make him the leader of this country.” A similar dynamic may soon play out in the Czech Republic, where former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš’s populist party currently leads in the polls.
The affinity between Nawrocki and Trump’s circle is no coincidence. The new Polish president shares the worldview articulated by U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference earlier this year,which cast mass migration, free speech, and “values” as principal threats to Western civilisation. In lending their support to Nawrocki, Trump and his allies aim to further destabilise and weaken the European Union, thereby undermining the global liberal order. As Slavoj Žižek has warned, “for Europe, the principle at stake is unconditional fidelity to the Enlightenment legacy”.
According to a 2010 ruling of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (K 32/09), the president and the prime minister share overlapping constitutional powers to represent Poland in EU affairs, necessitating coordination between them. Although the president does not formally direct foreign policy, Nawrocki will be well-positioned to steer Poland’s European engagement with narrative framing and strategic vetoes. The President holds the constitutional authority to veto parliamentary bills, including those implementing EU law, requiring a three-fifths majority in the Sejm to override the veto thereby giving him significant leverage over the government’s European agenda.
His declared Euroscepticism, aversion to deeper integration, and distance from EU institutions stand in stark contrast to the course charted by Tusk’s government since it took office in late 2023. During his campaign Nawrocki said that „Poland does not need a centralised state populated by EU citizens of Polish origin”. Although the government holds sole responsibility for shaping foreign relations, statements like this from the President can influence public sentiment and fuel anti-EU attitudes among voters.
On the issue of migration, President-elect Karol Nawrocki – while not fundamentally opposing Tusk’s approach – is anticipated to adopt even more hardline rhetoric, emphasizing national sovereignty and security. Since 2023 Tusk has implemented stringent migration policies, including suspending asylum rights at the Belarus borderand tightening regulations for foreign students and economic migrants, aiming to “regain control” over migration and enhance national security. In May 2025, he joined eight other European leaders in calling for a reconsideration of the European Convention on Human Rights as it pertains to migration. The leaders expressed concerns that the ECHR’s current interpretations hinder national governments’ abilities to manage irregular migration and expel foreign nationals who commit crimes.
Nawrocki’s election also casts a long shadow over the future disbursement of Next Generation EU funds. After the victory of the pro-democratic coalition in 2023, these funds were unblocked on the basis of the plan to restore the rule of law, which was seriously undermined during PiS rule between 2015 and 2023. The success of this plan relied on Trzaskowski winning the recent presidential elections and, as the President, siging the necessary bills. Nawrocki is expected to follow in the footsteps of his predecessor, Andrzej Duda, vetoing legislative efforts to address these deficiencies. While the European Commission has maintained cautious optimism about future cooperation, the continuation of fund disbursements might now hang in the balance. Proceeding with payments may expose the Commission to accusations of political inconsistency, whereas withholding them risks alienating a frontline member state bordering Ukraine and fuelling anti-EU sentiment – fertile ground for PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński in the run-up to the 2027 parliamentary elections.
In addition to EU policy, Nawrocki’s presidency could weaken Poland’s hitherto unwavering support for Ukraine. As underlined before, in Poland, it is traditionally the president who represents the country at NATO summits, not the prime minister. His scepticism towards NATO enlargement, echoing Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s stance, threaten to fracture the Western front against Kremlin aggression. This is particularly troubling given the uncertainty surrounding future U.S. foreign policy.
Nawrocki’s victory comes at a moment when Europe is striving to reassert itself on the global stage. Tusk had worked diligently to position Poland as a pillar of an emerging leadership triangle with Germany and France. Until Sunday, he stood as the principal architect of this alignment. Now, with Nawrocki’s win, Tusk’s government finds itself politically wounded. The prime minister has called for a vote of confidence to be held on 11 June, while at the same time, President Emmanuel Macron is struggling with domestic instability, and Chancellor Friedrich Merz, newly inaugurated, is still finding his footing. These developments could ultimately serve to advance Russia’s efforts to destabilize the European Union.
Nawrocki’s First Steps Toward Independence?
Andrzej Duda, regarding his relationship with Law and Justice leader Jarosław Kaczyński, aligned with Kaczyński’s directives throughout his tenure. By contrast, according to rumours, Nawrocki has already demonstrated a degree of personal independence. Notably, he reportedly declined Kaczyński’s proposal to appoint former Sejm Marshal Marek Kuchciński to a position within the Presidential Chancellery. Nawrocki appointed his own close allies, notably two long-time associates from the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), Leśkiewicz and Dębowski, whose political loyalty and usefulness were never vetted through PiS’s internal channels. It marks a significant departure from the Law and Justice party culture. These early signs might suggest that Nawrocki may not serve as a mere extension of PiS leadership, indicating a potential shift in the dynamic between the presidency and the party.
However, this independence appears largely tactical rather than ideological. Nawrocki is expected to align closely with the core tenets of Law and Justice (PiS), including a Eurosceptic stance, a strong pro-U.S. orientation, and a readiness to block key government initiatives through his veto power. His political base also suggests a possible shift even further to the right. His victory in the second round depended heavily on voters who had supported far-right candidates Grzegorz Braun and Sławomir Mentzen in the first, indicating pressure to accommodate more radical, nationalist elements. As a result, while his style may differ and his relationship with PiS leadership may be less deferential than Duda’s, Nawrocki’s substantive policies are likely to reinforce, and potentially intensify, the conservative-populist agenda that has dominated Polish politics over the past decade.
Although Nawrocki’s election does not mark the culmination of the struggle in the EU between pro-democratic and populist forces, it represents a significant advance for the latter. His victory was narrow–by approximately 400,000 votes–but with 10,440,648 votes, he secured the highest tally for any candidate since the 1990 election of Lech Wałęsa, the leader of the anti-Communist Solidarity movement. While the margin may be slim, his mandate is robust, and the ideas he espouses command considerable support within Polish society.