The General Court (GC) dismissed the action brought by the Association of Jurists for Respect for International Law (JURDI) under Article 265 TFEU in September 2025, amid the humanitarian crisis in Gaza resulting from the Israeli offense. JURDI requested the Court to declare that the EU institutions had failed to act in response to the situation in Gaza in accordance with the positive obligation to prevent genocide. In particular, JURDI argued, the EU should have suspended the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the EU and Israel, triggered appropriate sanctions, audited EU-Israel cooperation programmes, and issued a clear public position. Admittedly, the Court’s decision to deny locus standi to JURDI is consistent with the case law concerning individuals’ access to court under Articles 263 and 265 TFEU, notable for its strictness. However, aware of the limitations set out in the Treaties, we believe that there is a space for a more liberal interpretation of the rules of access to the CJEU, rooted in the core values of the EU. We argue, therefore, that it is high time the Court reconsider its stance on locus standi and move towards an inclusive and participatory model of legality review that would allow for actions to be brought by non-governmental organisations in the public interest of human rights compliance.

“Europe needs to do more.” Does this also apply to the CJEU?

On 5 September 2025, during the State of the Union, Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, stated that “what is happening in Gaza is unacceptable” and that in response to European citizens’ concerns “Europe needs to do more”. Thus, she declared that the Commission would propose “a package of measures to carve out a way forward”.

In reference to the statement by the President of the Commission, one might ask whether the CJEU could and should have done more in response to concerns voiced by citizens in the form of action for failure to act. The decision in the JURDI case is, however, yet another chapter in the ongoing saga of the CJEU’s intransigence regarding the standing of private applicants to lodge actions based on Articles 263 and 265 TFEU. Although the GC’s decision should come as no surprise, it is reasonable to question it in light of the core values of the Union, such as human rights and the rule of law, and the obligation to uphold these values in the external actions, as stated in Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU.

Background of the case

The ongoing armed conflict in the Gaza Strip has given rise to questions regarding Israel’s respect for international human rights in view of the unprecedented scale of intervention and its impact on the civilian population. In its Advisory Opinion from 19 July 2024, the International Court of Justice declared the Israeli occupation of Palestine as unlawful under international law and found a series of violations against IHRL in a form of, for instance, forcible evictions and discriminatory practices against the Palestinian population. The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, alongside other experts and civil society, has repeatedly emphasized that the Israeli offensive in Gaza meets the criteria for being classified as genocide.

In 2025, owing to mounting pressure from certain Member States and EU citizens, the European Commission has proposed a series of measures in response to Israel’s violations of international law in the occupied territories of Palestine. The High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy announced a review of the EU-Israel Association Agreement in order to asses Israel’s compliance with human rights and democratic principles (link). Consequently, the Commission proposed a partial suspension of Israel’s association to Horizon Europe (link). Moreover, it put forward a proposition to suspend trade concessions with Israel and to impose sanction on certain individuals (link). However, at the time of finalizing this article in January 2026, no significant sanctions had been imposed by the European Union itself.

In the light of the EU’s insufficient response to the breaches of international law, JURDI, the Association of Jurists for the Respect of International Law, founded in 2024 in order to promote respect for and the application of international law in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (link), called the EU institutions earlier this year to take appropriate action to ensure respect for international law. In the absence of appropriate response to the request, JURDI lodged a complaint under Article 265 TFEU for the failure to act.

Procedural pitfall

The GC declared the action manifestly inadmissible without further examining its merits, because it found that the applicant lacked standing under Article 265 TFEU. In that respect, GC reminded that Articles 263 and 265 TFEU constitute the expression of a single legal remedy, which means that conditions to attribute standing to an individual under 265 TFEU are virtually the same as those prescribed in 263 TFEU (para 10). Meaning that individuals can bring an action for annulment against an inaction of an institution not addressed to them, provided that the act concerns them directly and individually, or against regulatory acts that concern them directly and that do not include implementing measures (mutatis mutandis para. 10). Additionally, according to the CJEU’s case law, associations can generally be attributed legal standing if: (1) a legal provision expressly recognizes a series of procedural powers for such associations; (2) association represents the interests of individuals which would be entitled to bring an action, (3) the association is individualized because of the impact of the measure on its own interests as an association (see here and here).

Despite the claimant’s arguments, GC didn’t find it directly and individually affected by the inaction of the Council and the Commission. In that respect, it observed that none of the three measures that the Council and the Commission allegedly failed to adopt would directly affect JURDI’s legal situation by modifying its rights or obligations (para. 13). Especially, GC did not agree with the applicant’s argument that it was concerned directly since its statutory mission was based on the prevention of international crimes and genocide (para. 14, following Union syndicale-Service public européen ea v Council case-law). GC also found that the measures mentioned in the claim would not produce any direct effect on the legal situation of the JURDI’s members (para. 17). Additionally, GC established that JURDI is not individually concerned, since there is no clear evidence that it can be distinguished from any other association charged with similar mission (“contributing to the promotion, defence, respect and implementation of international law in France, Europe and the world in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”) (para. 20).

The GC didn’t also accept JURDI’s argumentation based on ClientEarth case in which a non-governmental organisation successfully brought an action for annulment in a public interest against a decision of the European Investment Bank rejecting the applicant’s request for an internal review of the resolution of the EIB’s Board of Directors approving the financing of a biomass power generation plant in Galicia. According to the GC, situations in these cases were not comparable, since in ClientEarth the Court simply recognized that an environmental NGO was entitled to request such a review in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application to the institutions and bodies of the European Union of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (OJ 2006, L 264, p. 13). Consequently, in ClientEarth the Court therefore did not rule on the admissibility under the general conditions laid in Article 263 TFEU but only applied an existing act of secondary legislation.

Criticism against the CJEU’s rigid stance

The JURDI case is yet another example of failed public interest litigation, which couldn’t stand the rigidity of the accessibility test under Articles 263 and 265 TFEU. The issue of the rigid standing criteria limiting, in many instances, access of individuals to the CJEU has been broadly discussed in the literature (see for instance here and here). It has also been a matter of consideration in prominent advocate general’s opinions both before the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty (see opinion in Unión de Pequeños Agricultore) and more recently in AG Emiliou’s opinion given in Nicoventures.

AG Emiliou, in his opinion, pointed out two major strands of criticism against the interpretative choices of the CJEU that led to a narrow understanding of the terms “direct” and especially “individual” concern. The first strand of criticism highlights that the case law of the CJEU on admissibility is complicated and incoherent. For example, in the case of locus standi of international actors, the CJEU tends to be more flexible in the interpretation of the premise of “legal person” mentioned in Article 263 TFEU (see discussion here). The second group of arguments concentrates on the fact that the current interpretation of the standing criteria is rendering public litigation in the common interest practically impossible in many instances (like in the case of legislative acts). Indeed, the recent Caravhalo judgement depicts how reluctant the CJEU is to relax its criteria of accessibility even in cases concerning the common threat that climate change poses.

As AG Emiliou rightly pointed out, it stands in contradiction with the ambitious axiological foundations of the Treaties (see the Opinion critically discussed here). Indeed, the strategic litigation of NGOs commonly concerns the protection of EU values like human rights and the rule of law. That was the case of the JURDI’s application. The GC was particularly silent on the issue that the goals the association pursues reflect the very values prescribed in Article 2 TEU as well as the principles and objectives of the EU’s external action recognized in Articles 3 (5) and 21 TEU. In that respect the GC merely followed the case law established since Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami – interpretation of the Article 263 TFEU cannot set aside conditions lied in Treaties of direct and individual concern (para. 27). However, one could wonder whether the CJEU really cannot make an interpretative choice to understand an association as directly and individually concerned by EU’s inaction that leads to the undermining of said associations mission (preventing genocide).

The argument for the admissibility of the public interest litigation

One can argue that the system of legal remedies in the EU is generally aimed at protecting individuals whose rights and freedoms are guaranteed by EU law, and have been violated, as stated in Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Thus, actions for annulment and for failure to act must be understood as measures designed to protect individual interests of the applicants. This would imply that since neither JURDI nor its members are affected by the institutions’ failure to act, the organisation cannot successfully initiate court proceedings. However, such a narrow reading of the provisions of the Treaties does not seem supported by the fundamental values and principles of the EU that should guide the Court in its interpretative activity. The Court has previously demonstrated its capacity to modify the interpretation of the Treaties when overriding considerations necessitate such action, as evidenced in its ruling in Les Verts. Why, then, wouldn’t the CJEU reconsider its stance on the criteria for admissibility in the context of Articles 263 and 265 TFEU?

First, as stated before, it can be argued that a civil society organisation should have a right to an effective judicial protection whenever an action or a failure to act on part of EU institutions threatens values which the organisation is promoting and protecting. This, in fact, constitutes an individual concern since ensuring respect for these values is the essence of the existence of such an organisation.

Second, one may question the Court’s stance on admissibility in light of the fact that the EU is a community based on the rule of law. However, a rigid interpretation of Article 263 and 265 TFEU has the effect of reducing the ability of this community to ensure that the law is upheld. Indeed, it reinforces a system of self-policing, which may be regarded as questionable not only from the perspective of rule of law but also the democratic foundations of the Union. It is, therefore, imperative that the CJEU, as the custodian of the law, assumes the responsibility entrusted to it by the Treaties (Article 19 TEU) to ensure compliance with fundamental values and, in order to fulfil this obligation, grant civil society organisations the possibility of litigation in the public interest. The question of admissibility does not prejudge the merits of the complaint. It merely establishes a forum through which compliance with fundamental values can be ensured, especially where neither EU institutions themselves nor Member States exhibit concern for the matter.

The additional dimension of this case that underscores the CJEU’s obscure reluctance is the fact that the EU-Israel agreement contains a human rights clause. Provisions designed by the EU precisely to avoid the situation of engagement in trade relations with a country that is violating international law. Suffice to say, the inspiration for its adoption was the suspension of the agreement with Yugoslavia in 1991 based on the customary international law (Racke). Human rights clauses have been mainstreamed for years on the EU’s own initiative.

Conclusions

Is public interest litigation before the CJEU a Sisyphean task? Despite the fact that the Court’s current case-law does not instil a sense of optimism, we remain hopeful that the answer to this question is a negative one. We believe it to be a laborious task, but not a futile one. Why? The current framework of the Treaties does not preclude the admissibility of the actions for annulment and for failure to act brought by civil society organisations in the public interest – only, in many instances, the interpretation given to it by the CJEU does. However, throughout the course of its history, the CJEU has repeatedly demonstrated its capacity to interpret acts of EU law from a liberal and pro-value standpoint.

In fact, it is worthwhile to critically revisit in this context the GC’s unfortunate and blatant observation that “associations have no right, under the Union legal order, to have the objectives of their activities unaffected by acts of the Union” (para. 16). Such an unnuanced reflection does not change anything as regards procedural law. It seems, however, out of kilter and in contrast with EU’s axiological foundations in the context of JURDI’s objectives to prevent international crimes and genocide.