“I don’t need international law.” This statement by US President Donald Trump is likely to go down in history, although it remains to be seen whether it will one day serve as evidence of the demise of the international legal order or as testimony to the unprecedented hubris of an authoritarian ruler. In his interview with the New York Times, Trump did not go so far as to deny the binding effect of international law. However, he declared himself the arbiter of when legal boundaries would apply to the US. Only his morals and his mind could stop him.

These statements, made immediately after the United States’ armed intervention in Venezuela, raise questions that go far beyond the classification of the specific operation under international law. The significance of the Venezuela case does not stem from the fact that international law has once again been violated, but from the circumstances surrounding the breach of law: a National Security Strategy published at the end of 2025, which reads like a neo-imperial document; the ongoing deliberations and threats to incorporate territories such as Greenland, and the striking and blunt openness about the economic motives for intervening in Venezuela, without even a pretext of an attempt to justify US actions within the established categories of international law.

The Illegality of the Use of Force

The international law applicable in the case of Venezuela is quickly explained: the US attack, dubbed “Operation Absolute Resolve”, not only disregarded Venezuela’s territorial sovereignty as guaranteed under international law. Above all, the military operation violated one of the cornerstones of the current international legal order, the prohibition of the use of force. Neither did the UN Security Council authorize military action, nor had Venezuela launched an armed attack that would have entitled the US to exercise its right to self-defence. In particular, forms of alleged narco-terrorism, which the US administration pointed to in the context of the various boat strikes, do not come close to triggering the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter and customary international law.

It is true that Nicolás Maduro is not a democratically legitimised ruler. However, this fact does not justify the breach of the prohibition of the use of force. It was already highly questionable to deny Maduro’s status under international law as the head of state of Venezuela at the time of the attack, as the US did. This is because Maduro’s position of power remained effective until the US took forcible action. Nor had the international community, for example in the United Nations, agreed to collectively deny Maduro’s status as head of state.

But even if one disagrees with these assessments, this would not alter the illegality of the use of force. In the case of military intervention by invitation, the US would have had to obtain the consent of a person authorised to represent Venezuela before the military operation. There is no evidence of such a request. Whether Maduro was the head of state of Venezuela on 3 January is therefore only relevant to the question of whether the US additionally committed a violation of immunity and whether such a violation has continuing effects in the ongoing criminal proceedings in New York.

Finally, the accusation of systematic human rights violations frequently levelled against Maduro is also irrelevant with respect to the legality of the operation under the framework of the jus ad bellum. According to the prevailing view in international law, this is already the case because the use of military force to end human rights violations requires authorisation by the Security Council. However, even if a so-called humanitarian intervention were considered permissible in an extreme case without such authorisation, this would not justify the use of force in question. According to all available information, the human rights violations in Venezuela did not reach near-genocidal proportions. Moreover, the US attack was declared to have objectives other than ending possible human rights violations – namely, the execution of arrest warrants for drug trafficking, the acquisition of control over Venezuelan oil, and ultimately the consolidation of US hegemony over the continent.

From Unlawfulness to Lawlessness

Any violation of the prohibition of the use of force under international law is serious in and of itself, and this is all the more so if committed by a permanent member of the Security Council. The significance of this particular breach of law, however, has wider ramifications. “Operation Absolute Resolve” testifies to the determination of the US government to descend into lawlessness. Only superficially does this intervention appear to be a mere repetition of the kind of intervention that the US undertook in Panama in 1989/1990. At that time, too, the US intervened militarily in a Latin American state and flew its ruler, General Manuel Noriega, out of the country to prosecute him in the US on charges of drug trafficking. Then, as now, the situation under international law was relatively clear. Yet the US did put forward legal arguments that were at least debatable. Panamanian security forces had attacked US soldiers in Panama, and General Noriega had declared war on the US in the run-up to the intervention. The first Bush administration sought to present its actions as compliant with international law and to put forward the most plausible argument possible under the circumstances. Even in the case of the 2003 Iraq War, whose illegality had triggered considerable criticism worldwide in academic and public debate, the US presented a justification that was not entirely untenable under international law.

By contrast, there was no sign of any effort to argue in line with established criteria of international law when Trump, Hegseth and Rubio appeared before the press the morning after the conclusion of “Operation Absolute Resolve”. None of the three mentioned the words “international law”. Instead, the undisguised message was that it was all about oil. It is difficult to recall a moment since the UN Charter came into force when the government of a member state has so blatantly failed to justify its violation of the prohibition of the use of force as the United States did on 3 January this year.

Anyone who had hoped that the US would show a different face when the UN Security Council convened for an emergency meeting two days later was disappointed after the US representative took the floor. While he refrained from explicitly describing ‘Operation Absolute Resolve’ as an armed operation to seize Venezuelan oil, his description of the military attack as a “surgical operation to execute two US arrest warrants” offered no cause for relief. This was not primarily because of the echoes of Putin’s cynical cloaking of Russia’s war of aggression as a “special military operation”. Above all, the fact that the US military operation was based solely on a claim of enforcing US criminal justice confirmed the disregard for international law. US law was elevated to the sole decisive standard worldwide.

A New Vision of Order

The case of Venezuela fits into larger trends that distinguish it significantly from previous US military interventions and highlight the profound upheavals we are facing: This intervention is not about interest-driven realpolitik that overstretches and abuses legal arguments; it is not a matter of shaping the law in the interests of the hegemon. Rather, one might be tempted, along with Henry Kissinger, to see Trump as a “historical figure” who is putting the final nail in the coffin of an era that has come to an end, without offering an alternative model of order to replace it. In fact, the international (legal) order has been subject to profound criticism for some time now due to systemic legitimacy deficits perceived by a variety of actors. These concerns range from international law’s historical involvement in projects of colonialism and imperialism to current debates about double standards in the enforcement of international law. In addition, the limited capacity for reform of the international system contributes to the impression held by some that international law is basically operating on the basis of outdated criteria that lack representativeness, particularly with regard to institutions such as the UN Security Council. In this light, Trump’s foreign policy, as Daniel Marwecki recently pointed out, could act as a catalyst, breaking down traditional certainties and entrenched path dependencies in an unorthodox way and clearing the way for something new.

However, while Kissinger’s thesis of a shift towards the uncertain could claim a certain plausibility under the first Trump administration, the measures taken by the second Trump administration do indeed point to a new vision of order. This vision is characterised by a departure from the principles of political rule as they have developed since early modernity and gives rise to fears of a dissolution of any power limits for a few states or even individuals. The emerging understanding of political rule at the international level combines feudalistic practices and mafia-like methods with ideas of private corporate governance, which unfold against the backdrop of a libertarian understanding of an economy that is based on barely concealed cliques. In this context, the spectres of imperialism and colonialism reappear. As a result, the idea of statehood as legally founded and limited, and as committed to the common good, is ultimately renounced; ideas that are reflected at the level of international law: the legitimisation of the exercise of power in the pursuit of common public interests, the limitation of sovereignty through the allocation of responsibilities and the demarcation of competences, the recognition of other actors and their interests as legitimate, the differentiation between public and private, between internal and external, between war and peace. The latter distinctions in particular have been under considerable pressure for some time now for a variety of reasons, but the Trump administration’s foreign policy actions seem to be seeking to permanently undermine any understanding of political rule that also aims to contain power.

Signs of this include not only the considerable personal threats against Venezuela’s interim president. The statements made to Denmark regarding Greenland, particularly in the run-up to the World Economic Forum in Davos, as well as the dismissive treatment of Ukrainian President Zelensky in the White House, also reflect the explicit hierarchisation of the global state system reminiscent of feudalism, in which other states are dependent on Trump’s personal goodwill. The fundamental distinction between public authority and personal property is dissolved when the American president attempts to derive private benefit from his public duties. This applies to his efforts to obtain control over Greenland (or at least parts of it) not only for security reasons, but also with the aim of exploiting its resources. Moreover, the construction of the peace plan for Gaza shows how much the exercise of public authority is mixed with private action. Unlike comparable cases in the past, the role of international institutions, such as the World Bank, is being diminished. At the same time, a “Board of Peace” headed by Donald Trump is to manage a “special economic zone” based on ideas of private corporate governance, thus creating spaces that are gradually slipping out of public control.

A Pre-Legal Understanding of Sovereignty

What is more, the Board of Peace seems to have morphed into a more general vehicle for realizing the Trump Administration’s new vision of world order. The foundational Charter of the Board does not even mention Gaza. Instead, it is now styled as a self-standing international organization with a highly unusual conception of governance. This includes the twofold role of Donald Trump as Chairman in a personal capacity and possibly beyond the end of this term in office as US President, as well as his role as the representative of the United States on the Board. The decisions of the Board are subject to his approval and he “is the final authority regarding the meaning, interpretation and application of this Charter” (Art 7). While it remains to be seen how impactful this dystopian vision of a highly privatized international organization will become, the damage is already done: a permanent member of the UN Security Council is attempting to launch a new – almost autocratic – form of multilateral organization in outright competition to the UN system as such.

These developments come together with a pre-legal understanding of sovereignty that exempts the US president from (international) legal obligations by elevating him, in the sense of Carl Schmitt, to the role of an unbound guardian of his nation’s welfare. Numerous statements by President Trump, Vice President Vance, or White House Deputy Chief of Staff Miller reflect this understanding, for example when the US president says, “He who saves his country does not violate the law.” The President expressed a similar view in the New York Times interview referred to in the introduction. Observers describe this understanding of power in various combinations as feudal, mafia-like, imperialistic or even fascist. Ultimately, these historical comparisons and metaphorical labels serve to make tangible a paradigm shift that is unfolding before our eyes. The fact that political language has not yet developed precise terminology to describe this foundational change does not justify considering the current situation as “business as usual” in light of past US intervention practices.

Europe’s Choice

What does this mean for German foreign policy and that of other European states? In German foreign policy discourse, some voices argue that Europe can no longer afford to stand up for international law in view of its military and digital weakness in the new global political constellation. According to this view, the decision to keep the US on board in defending Ukraine must be the deciding factor. In light of the concurrence of a devastating Russian war of aggression and the rejection of legal obligations by the US in international politics, it is supposedly a matter of political wisdom to put international law on the back burner for the time being in order to avoid open contradiction with the Western alliance’s foremost power. From this perspective, the German Chancellor’s incorrect classification of the Venezuela mission as “legally complex” was understandable in light of the “politically complex” situation for Europe.

Those who tend to share this view should bear in mind that, with its statements on Greenland, the US administration has already set its sights on European territory. While the Davos conference may have provided some form of détente for the time being, it remains to be seen how the announced agreement on greater US influence over parts of Greenland will unfold and whether the outcome of these negotiations will placate the US administration. A glance at the US National Security Strategy of December 2025 shows that Greenland may in any case not be the end of it. In that document, Europe is treated – cynically put – no differently than the rest of the world. The security strategy announces, in a barely veiled manner, that the new MAGA establishment in the US can also envisage “regime change” in Europe in order to halt its supposed civilisational decline, which European governments are said to foster, inter alia, by allegedly censoring freedom of expression.

After the case of Venezuela, there can be no doubt that the announcements in the National Security Strategy are more than just rhetoric. Thus, with every violation of international law by the US on other continents, which Germany and other European states do not call out for fear of a reaction from the US President, the danger increases that the US’s behaviour will have further repercussions. Above all, powers with imperial tendencies that, unlike Russia, have not yet permanently abandoned the path of compliance with international law may feel challenged to emulate the United States. At the same time, German and European silence on US violations of international law threatens to reduce the group of states whose solidarity European states can count on should the US or other imperial powers turn against them. States such as Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and South Africa are likely to have felt abandoned by Europe during the Security Council debate on the Venezuela case. The fact that seven European heads of government immediately thereafter emphatically invoked international law with regard to Greenland did not improve matters regarding the “Global South”. If Europe applies double standards depending on whether the case concerns Venezuela or Greenland, disappointment or resentment in the “Global South” is inevitable. It is not in Europe’s interest to provoke such reactions time and again. Europe will need a coalition, particularly with democratic states from the ‘Global South’, to counter the neo-imperial logic of US and Russian actions, with the possibility of China joining them. This should include a willingness to make compromises with the “Global South” on contested international legal policy issues, for example when it comes to the role of the UN General Assembly in the UN system or policy decisions on the future direction of international economic law.

Eventually, Germany and the other European states cannot afford to abandon international law – and the international legal order cannot be preserved with only selective commitment to it. Germany should therefore join forces with as many other states as possible to signal to the US that it is not prepared to go down the path of lawlessness in international relations, regardless of which continent is involved. Obviously, this is a highly inconvenient stand to adopt in view of Germany’s own relative military and digital weakness. But if countries such as Colombia and Mexico, which are directly exposed to the threats of the US president, are prepared to uphold international law in the Security Council, then Germany, France, and the United Kingdom should also be prepared to do so.

What Can Europe Offer?

In this undertaking, European countries should remember their strengths. Even under the new global political circumstances, Europe remains a player whose economic weight cannot be ignored for the time being. More importantly, Europe stands for a normative alternative that holds global appeal in contrast to the imperial-feudalistic US vision of order. The attractiveness of the set of ideas to which Europe is indebted is closely linked to the call for legally justifying the exercise of political power and to the legal limitations placed upon it, both internally and externally. Europe should advance its normative offer at the international level, especially vis-à-vis states of the “Global South,” and forge new coalitions with them in the interests of freedom, equality and solidarity. In that context, it is a hopeful sign that trade relations appear to be in the process of being strengthened between the European Union and Latin American States (Mercosur) as well as India.

On 18 January, eight European states declared regarding the escalation of the Greenland conflict: “We are committed to upholding our sovereignty.” That is precisely the point. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney clearly stated the alternative at the World Economic Forum in Davos on 21 January: “This is not sovereignty. It’s the performance of sovereignty while accepting subordination.” This would be the consequence if middle powers stopped defending international law. The sovereignty of militarily weaker states ultimately arises only from international law. To defend the international legal order is thus in our own best interest.

The initial version of this article appeared in German in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on 22 January 2026 (p. 6); the English version has been updated to reflect developments until 30 January 2026. The translation was prepared with the help of DeepL.