On 8 March 2026, Mojtaba Khamenei, Ali Khamenei’s second son, was announced as the third Supreme Leader, the Wali-ye Faqih.  With this appointment, the regime signals its determination to preserve the facade of constitutional continuity surrounding Velayat-e Faqih (Mandate of the Islamic Jurist), for without it, the regime would lose the very foundation of its self-constructed political authority. The succession of Mojtaba Khamenei brings into view the regime’s inability to apply its own legitimising principles to its rule, as well as the deep constitutional tensions on which this system rests.

While alternatives such as a secular democratic order, proposed by prominent opposition figures, are gaining traction, the remnants of the Islamic Republic are confronted with the erosion of the system they upheld for decades.

Legitimising clerical rule

 After 47 years of theocratic rule, the constitutional foundation of the Islamic Republic of Iran appears to have reached an inflection point. Following the Israeli and US strikes, the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei died on 28 February 2026 in a bunker beneath his central compound in Tehran. The significance of his death can only be understood against the constitutional doctrine that legitimises clerical rule in the Islamic Republic.

The leader of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Ruhollah Khomeini, introduced through his foundational work on Velayat-e Faqih a historically unprecedented conception of a clerical claim to state authority. According to his doctrine, the clergy’s legitimacy to govern a state is grounded in the theological assumption that the Islamic jurist is vested with a divine mandate to represent the occulted last Shia Imam Mehdi on earth. Art. 5 of the Constitution of 1979 reflects this principle by prescribing that “During the Occultation of the Wali al-Asr (may God hasten his reappearance), the wilayah and leadership of the Ummah devolve upon the just […] and pious […] faqih”, the Supreme Leader. As the highest representative of the hidden Imam, the Wali-ye Faqih holds a supervisory role over the political process, whilst issuing religious rulings, such as fatwas. To fulfil both a political and a religious role, the Wali-ye Faqih must possess a profound understanding of Islamic scholarship, since his guardianship over the state depends upon his theological jurisprudence.

Prior to the incorporation of Velayat-e Faqih into the Constitution of 1979, the question of Velayat (authority) of the Islamic jurist had long been debated within the Shia tradition of jurisprudence. These debates were generally marked by restraint concerning the extent to which clerical authority should interfere with the public sphere. It is undisputed that Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) can set out authoritative rules for certain private day-to-day matters. In the sphere of politics (siyasat), however, Islamic jurists in Iran historically exercised little, if any, direct authority over public affairs. By establishing a single clerical head of state, the constitutional concept of Velayat-e Faqih presented a significant rupture with this separation between siyasat (politics) and fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence).

The divine mandate inscribed in the Constitution of 1979 gives the Wali-ye Faqih the authority to exercise clerical supervision in all public matters (velāyat-e moṭlaq), which has resulted in a constitutional order characterised by considerable internal contradictions. While the Constitution of 1979 recognises the sovereignty of the people and formally grants them the right to elect the president and parliament, it also restricts this right almost entirely through the control exercised by the Faqih and his subordinate religious institutions. Further, the Iranian state recognises the separation of the state into legislative, judicial and executive powers, but replaces the internal checks-and-balances system according to Art. 57 with “the supervision of the absolute wilayat al-‘amr and the leadership of the ummah”, that is, the Wali-ye Faqih. After all, even the fundamental rights listed in the Constitution of 1979 are subject to the limits of Islamic law.

Since Ali Khamenei came to power, the centrality of the office of the Supreme Leader has increased even further. Through the restructuring of the state and the wide-ranging influence exerted over the composition of the Expediency Discernment Council, Assembly of Experts and Parliament, the Faqih exercises extensive and nearly unlimited control over all branches of government, as well as state television and the cultural sector. Today, the state’s chain of command is so profoundly influenced by this office that its removal would render the state, in its current form, virtually incapable of functioning.

A regime bound by its founding doctrine

Given the system’s heavy reliance on the office of the Supreme Leader, the question of its succession exposes the regime’s inherent shortcomings in legitimising its claim to rule. Critics have long argued that the election of the second religious leader, Ali Khamenei, was unconstitutional, as he did not fulfil the religious qualifications associated with the position of the Supreme Leader and was only later elevated to the status of an Ayatollah.

Up until Khamenei’s election, the Leader was required to hold the rank of Marjaʿ-e Taqlid, denoting the highest scholarly rank and the recognition of that authority by followers. This qualification was constitutionally reduced to the lower rank of a Mojtahed, a scholar qualified to independently exercise Islamic legal reasoning. The lowered criteria weakened the concept of Velayat-e Faqih, as the religious authority is central for its doctrinal construct. Still, the constitutional amendment was founded upon debates in the Assembly for Revision of the Constitution, showing a certain commitment to conformity with the existing legal provisions.

Today, even after the required clerical rank for the potential successor had been lowered to that of a Mojtahed, the office remained exceedingly difficult to fill in a manner consistent with its respective political and religious claims to authority.

Herein lies a fundamental dilemma for the Islamic Republic: the regime is unable to comply with the requirements it has set for the office of Wali-ye Faqih, yet it continues to derive its legitimacy to rule doctrinally from this very concept. At the same time, because the principle of Velayat-e Faqih is so deeply ingrained in the regime’s institutional structure, it cannot simply be abandoned. The result is a state that clings to the principle of Velayat-e Faqih, even though it has long ceased to be viable.

The next Khamenei in line

With the election of Khamenei’s son, the office of the Supreme Leader has departed even further from its initial criteria and assumed characteristics of a hereditary form of rule historically contested within Shia jurisprudence.

The dual nature of the position as a political and a religious leader is reflected in the constitutional criteria for his selection outlined in Art. 109: “a. scholarly qualification for issuing religious ruling [fatwa] in different fields of fiqh [islamic jurisprudence]. […] c. right political and social perspicacity, prudence, courage, administrative facilities and adequate capability for leadership”. The third Wali-ye Faqih, Mojtaba Khamenei, is a comparatively young scholar who has never published any Islamic jurisprudence of significance. It has also been reported that he first entered religious schooling only in his thirties. This strongly suggests that Mojtaba Khamenei does not even meet the rank of Mojtahed. His political standing cannot compensate for this either, as Mojtaba Khamenei has never held a formal public office and has yet to address the public directly. In contrast to his father Ali Khamenei, who prior to his election served as president of the Islamic Republic and at least fulfilled the rank of Mojtahed, his now elected son does not appear to satisfy any of the qualifications set out in Art. 109 of the Constitution of 1979.

Further, Art. 109 of the Constitution of 1979 prescribes that “In case of multiplicity of persons fulfilling the above qualifications and conditions, the person with better insight in fiqh and politics shall be preferred”. Although no potential successor would have fully complied with the conditions laid down in Art. 109, numerous candidates nonetheless possessed religious and political credentials that clearly surpassed those of Mojtaba Khamenei.

To understand Mojtaba Khamenei’s election, one must examine the Assembly of Experts, which, under Art. 107 of the Constitution of 1979, elected him as successor in a disputed emergency session. During Ali Khamenei’s tenure, this 88-member clerical body, formally composed of senior Shia scholars, was progressively filled with Ali Khamenei’s own loyal followers, a development closely tied to the long-anticipated succession of Mojtaba Khamenei.

The appointment of the new Wali-ye Faqih by the Assembly of Experts may have resolved the immediate issue of succession within the Islamic Republic. However, while the regime has long since lost its legitimacy among broad sections of the population, the election of Ali Khamenei’s son shows that it is no longer even capable of adhering to the self-constructed legitimacy required for the continuation of its theocratic rule.

Since Mojtaba Khamenei does not appear to enjoy any support among the Iranian public, whose demands for a secular state have become increasingly explicit, the question that now remains is how long this new Supreme Leader can maintain his tenuous hold on power.