27 January 2020
The Hungarian “Lex NGO” before the CJEU: Calling an Abuse of State Power by its Name
On 14 January 2020, Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered his Opinion in Case C-78/18 on the restrictions incorporated into a 2017 Hungarian law on the financing of NGOs from abroad. He makes clear that Hungary’s “Lex NGO” not only restricts the free movement of capital but also violates several fundamental rights, and is therefore incompatible with EU law. Continue reading >>
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11 November 2019
The von der Leyen Commission and the Future of the Rule of Law
Ursula von der Leyen’s promotional tour before her election did not turn out well. She failed to point to substantive rule of law issues, rather she traced back the division between Eastern and Western European state to emotional components. This text takes a look beyond the political rhetoric and explores what the new Commission might entail for the rule of law in the EU. Continue reading >>23 September 2019
Luxemburg as the Last Resort
A criminal proceeding has been suspended by a Hungarian justice of the Pest Central District Court to ask the European Court of Justice preliminary questions, inter alia, about his own judicial independence. Now, Hungary’s Supreme Court has stepped in and ruled that the reference was illegal, essentially arguing that preliminary references are not the fora to discuss such claims. In fact, however, this preliminary reference reveals that all other means to effectively challenge the rule of law backsliding in Hungary have failed. Continue reading >>
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03 June 2019
The puissance of infringement procedures in tackling rule of law backsliding
In this blog post Petra Bárd and Anna Śledzińska-Simon propose the CJEU to introduce “rule of law infringement procedures”, having both a fast-track and a freezing component, as part of a wider “EU rule of law toolbox”. Continue reading >>
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18 September 2018
The Four Elements of the Autocrats’ Playbook
There is truth in the old maxim proclaiming the imperative to try to get to know your enemies well. We outline four key techniques deployed by the autocratic regimes in Poland and Hungary in order to consolidate the constitutional capture and massive assault on European values and take a look at some of the elements of each of the four. Continue reading >>29 July 2018
The CJEU in the Celmer case: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back for Upholding the Rule of Law Within the EU
Surrender cases are litmus tests for the EU’s approach towards the enforcement of the rule of law in the Member States. Without judicial independence and other elements of the rule of law concept, EU law will cease to be operational, whether in the context of the single market or outside of it. Aranyosi and LM are the beginning of a long journey. In a more general sense, these cases demonstrate that ultimately – as in all incomplete constitutional systems – it is the courts which play a crucial role in carving out and applying rule of law and fundamental rights exceptions. Continue reading >>
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02 July 2018
The AG Opinion in the Celmer Case: Why Lack of Judicial Independence Should Have Been Framed as a Rule of Law Issue
On 28 June 2018, Advocate General Evgeni Tanchev delivered his Opinion in the Case C‑216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v LM on the surrender of a crime suspect to Poland. The issue is whether Mr. Artur Celmer, referred to by the Opinion as LM, should be surrendered from Ireland to Poland when there are serious doubts as to whether he would receive a fair trial, due to the alleged lack of independence of the judiciary resulting from recent changes to the Polish judicial system. Continue reading >>10 April 2018
Judicial Independence as a Precondition for Mutual Trust
The Celmer case calls for us to reflect on the question what role judicial authorities can and should play in ensuring compliance with democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights (DRF) in other EU Member States. In our view, judicial authorities ultimately have an independent responsibility to put a halt to surrenders, in case the wanted person’s fair trial rights are put in peril due to a general lack of judicial independence in the issuing state. At the same time, the political responsibility for balancing diverse EU constitutional principles needs to be borne by democratically elected institutions. Therefore, the court of the executing state should not only halt or suspend judicial cooperation in the event that persuasive pieces of evidence point to a violation of the values shared by the EU and the Member States in the issuing state, but it should also freeze the case awaiting a resolution of the matter from political actors. Continue reading >>
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