Game of Chicken
Yesterday, on September 12th, the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting en banc, heard eight petitions challenging a hotly contested constitutional amendment. The Court has rarely sat en banc in the past, and this is the first time that it sits in a composition of fifteen justices, attesting to the importance that the Court attributes to this decision. The amendment modifies Basic Law: the Judiciary, which protects judicial independence, lays out the process of judicial selection for all the state courts and grants the Supreme Court the authority to supervise state action when the Court convenes in its capacity as a High Court of Justice. In this blog, I will explain each side’s arguments and the strategic considerations behind the Attorney General’s unprecedented move to push the Court to explicitly invalidate a constitutional amendment. I will show how both sides ultimately found themselves dragged into a game of chicken from which they could not back down. Continue reading >>The Folly of the Israeli Government in Restricting Reasonableness
On Monday, July 24, the Israeli legislature passed a constitutional amendment that would constrain the courts’ ability to use the reasonableness doctrine. The reasonableness doctrine is a common law doctrine developed by the Israeli courts to review executive decisions. Without the reasonableness doctrine, Israel is more conflicted than ever, and vulnerable to the spread of the scourge of corruption. The government shot itself in the foot both domestically and internationally. Continue reading >>Did Israel Lose its Sanity?
Israel is in the midst of an acute struggle over its constitutional identity. We are witnessing a government adamant about revolutionizing Israel’s constitution (“Basic Laws”), which may typically be amended by a simple majority of the legislature and is thus prey to the whims of an extreme government. The most recent move on the government’s agenda, passing a constitutional amendment that would severely restrict the reasonableness doctrine, would bring Israel closer to the brink of constitutional chaos. In this blog, I explain the theoretical arguments in favor and against the proposal and lay out the implications, should this proposal go through, given the government’s true, concerning motivations that are already evident on the grounds. Continue reading >>War over Israel’s Judicial Independence
The new Israeli government wasted no time in initiating an all-out attack on the independence of the judiciary. It is promoting in full speed two parallel proposals to reform the judiciary in the hope that at least one of them, or a hybrid of both will be codified. The government claims that its proposed judicial reform will promote a more democratic and representative judiciary. Yet, a careful analysis of its proposed reform suggests that the government intends to fully politicize the judiciary. It will change the process of appointment to the Judicial Selection Committee, placing control in the hands of the government. Simultaneously, it will neutralize the ability of the opposition in the Knesset and the professional elites (the Justices and the Bar Association) to protect judicial independence from governmental takeover. Continue reading >>The Theoretical Limits on the Override Power
In 2019, anticipating that Israel might one day adopt an express override mechanism that would enable the Israeli legislature (the Knesset) to override the Basic Laws (Israel’s Constitution), I developed a novel theoretical framework to limit the override power. With the new hard-right government, my theory might be tested in practice. I therefore want to make this theory available in English for international audiences. Continue reading >>On the Nexus between Separation of Powers and Judicial Power
This exercise in comparative constitutional law shows how, paradoxically, positioning a country on either side of the spectrum of separation of powers structures may lead to similar curtailment of the judiciary’s power, though courts in the two opposing regimes may use very different, and even opposing, judicial doctrines to reach similar non-interventionalist results. Moreover, though scholars typically study these common law judicial doctrines independently of one another, they are all a manifestation of how strong or weak the separation of powers in a given country is. Ultimately, the judicial branch may supplement, but not supplant, the democratically elected political branches, irrespective of the separation of powers in the country in question
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