Unwavering Loyalty

On 5 August 2025, the Cameroonian Constitutional Council upheld a Resolution made by Cameroon’s elections management body to exclude opposition leader Maurice Kamto from the presidential election scheduled for 12 October 2025. The decision effectively eliminates the strongest opposition contender from the race. This places further strains on the future of the democratic experiment in Cameroon, where the second longest serving African leader, President Paul Biya, is set to run for an eighth presidential term after 43 years in power.

The Constitutional Council was misguided by its narrow formalism which impeded a proper appreciation of the law. While judicial formalism may, in some cases, be defensible for the sake of certainty and predictability, the Constitutional Council’s selective adherence to it makes its motivation questionable.

Kamto’s petition in the Constitutional Council

Maurice Kamto submitted his candidacy for the upcoming presidential election as the candidate for the African Movement for New Independence and Democracy (MANIDEM). In a resolution, the national elections management body, Elections Cameroon (ELECAM), rejected Kamto’s application on grounds of a “plurality of nominations”, since Dieudonné Yebga also submitted his candidacy for the same election on MANIDEM’s ticket, claiming to have been nominated by that party. Kamto appealed to the Constitutional Council for the annulment of ELECAM’s Resolution. The Constitutional Council resolved to hear Kamto’s and Yebga’s petitions jointly, noting their clear connection and the need for a single ruling (p. 71).

Kamto raised several grounds, two of which stand out. First, that the Resolution was not supported in law. Second, that the Resolution undermined his eligibility and infringed on his freedom to contest the election despite having duly complied with sections 117-118 and 120-124 of the Electoral Code, which set out the requirements for candidacy.

Yegba, with the support of the Ministry of Territorial Administration (MINAT), challenged the regularity of Kamto’s nomination largely on the basis that Kamto was nominated by MANIDEM’s president, Anicet Ekane, rather than by its coordinating committee which the party’s internal regulations empowered to nominate a candidate for elections (pp. 42, 46-48). Yegba further claimed that this institution had nominated him, not Kamto.

Kamto, with the support of MANIDEM represented by its president Ekane, disputed these allegations, asserting that Yebga was not even a member of MANIDEM, having been dismissed on 2 June 2018 (p. 70). The decisive issue before the Constitutional Council thus turned on the regularity of Kamto’s nomination by MANIDEM.

The Constitutional Council decision

The Constitutional Council dismissed the two principal grounds of Kamto’s petition as unfounded (N°28/CC/SRCER of 04-05 August 2025 [unpublished], p. 78). On the first ground – the alleged absence of a legal basis for ELECAM’s decision – the Constitution Council inferred from the Electoral Code that, as the constituency of the presidential election is national, a political party may only be represented by a single candidate. It follows that section 121(1) of the Electoral Code implicitly forbids multiple nominations, since a competing list of candidates would be incompatible with the single-constituency nature of the presidential election (p. 73).

Citing its prior jurisprudence (Decision No32/CC/SRCER and Decision No08/CC/SRCER of 15 February 2023 [unpublished]), the Council reaffirmed that a political party cannot submit two competing lists of candidates for the same constituency (p. 74). It further noted that sections 127 and 128 of the Electoral Code specify only two situations for replacing a nominee – death or disqualification – and reasoned that the clarity of the law made it unnecessary to expressly prohibit multiple nominations (pp. 75-76).

On the second ground – alleging infringement on the eligibility and validity of Kamto’s candidacy –, the Constitutional Council acknowledged that Kamto had satisfied the legal conditions relating to his candidacy. However, it emphasized that ELECAM’s Resolution rested on the irregularity of his nomination (p. 76). Resolving the issue, the Council said, would involve interference in the internal affairs of MANIDEM, a sphere beyond its jurisdiction. It therefore invoked previous jurisprudence to justify non-intervention (p. 77).

A reasoning imbued with narrow formalism

It is evident that the Constitutional Council adhered rigidly to a textual interpretation of the Electoral Code and its questionable jurisprudence constante. While judicial formalism may serve useful purposes – such as promoting clarity, restraint, and predictability – the Council’s approach here was both restrictive and selective.

By claiming that sections 127 and 128 provide clarity on multiple nominations, the Council ignored an obvious gap in the law: those provisions concern replacement due to disqualification or death – not the validity or number of nominations. More significantly, the Constitutional Council simply cited its previous jurisprudence to justify its non-interventionist stance, without identifying any underlying legal principles.

This narrow formalism fails to clarify the jurisprudential basis of the decision, that is the definition of interference. It also disregards potential material differences between Kamto’s petition and earlier cases. In Agbor Omar v Republic of Cameroon (discussed here), for example, the Supreme Court (then sitting as the Constitutional Council) reviewed the internal regulations of Cameroon Peoples’ Democratic Movement (CPDM) and concluded that President Biya’s nomination for the 2004 election was valid. That review did not constitute interference. Yet in Kamto’s case, a similar exercise would have constituted interference. A detailed analysis of these distinctions could have allowed the Constitutional Council to develop clear normative standards for political party nominations in the event of multiple nominations and for the limits of its own non-interventionist stance. Formalism aspires to clarity and precision – this decision achieved neither.

The correct formula for a suspect purpose?

Despite the Constitutional Council’s attempt to demonstrate consistency, its selective use of formalism is clear. In other decisions on electoral matters, the same Council has embraced an expansive interpretation of the law, particularly where the outcome favoured the ruling CPDM. Two examples suffice here to elucidate that point.

In the recent petition, Akere Muna v ELECAM, Biya(CPDM) and MINAT (Decision N° 39/CC/SRCER of 22 August 2025 [unpublished]), the Constitutional Council readily adopted a purposive interpretation of section 118(1) of the Electoral Code. It provides that “[a]ll persons who, by their own doing, have placed themselves in a situation of dependence on or connivance with a foreign person, organisation or power or foreign State shall not be eligible” to contest as a candidate in presidential elections. Muna’s petition alleged that incumbent President Biya had placed himself in a position of dependence for which he should be disqualified from the imminent presidential elections. The Constitutional Council rejected the claim, in part because Muna’s allegations alluded to dependence on domestic “persons” whereas section 118(1) was concerned with dependence on “a foreign person”. It went on to assert that a combined analysis of the French and English versions of section 118(1) revealed the legislator’s intent to safeguard national security – a stretch well beyond the text of the provision.

Similarly, in Joshua Osih (SDF) v ELECAM, CPDM and Orse, an opposition candidate petitioned the Constitutional Council for the annulment of presidential election results. He claimed significant electoral irregularities and separatist induced insecurity, leading to mass disfranchisement in the North-West and South-West Regions of Cameroon. The Constitutional Council nonetheless confirmed the results as valid. It formulated a principle presenting the freedom to vote or to abstain from voting as an element of the right to vote, despite the silence of the Constitution or any subordinate legislation on the constituent elements of that right. These precedents expose a pattern of interpretative elasticity when the outcome benefits the CPDM and rigid textualism when it disfavours the opposition.

Conclusion

The Constitutional Council’s decision in the Kamto petition must be understood in the wider context of the political landscape which has been largely hostile to the political opposition. In the lead-up to the 12 October presidential election, hostilities have intensified, challenging the fairness of the electoral landscape and potentially undermining the regularity of the election.

Within that climate, the Constitutional Council’s selective formalism has caused it to abdicate its constitutional and statutory duty to ensure the regularity of presidential elections. By excluding a viable contender, the decision has deepened doubts about the Constitutional Council’s impartiality and eroded its already fragile legitimacy. A consistent interpretation and application of the law – applied equally to all parties – is now required to restore public trust and to support the democratic experiment in Cameroon.