The Slow Death of Human Rights
Why Restoring the Death Penalty Would Put Kyrgyzstan in Breach of International Law
Recent discussions in Kyrgyzstan about reintroducing capital punishment for the most heinous crimes – such as femicide and child abuse – have reinstated a debate that many assumed was permanently closed. Following several egregious crimes against women and children, President Sadyr Japarov publicly suggested that the death penalty might be restored. Politically, this statement can be considered a populist response to capitalise on the public outrage over gender-based violence. But beneath this political rhetoric lies a multi-faceted legal issue: Kyrgyzstan abolished the death penalty almost twenty years ago, binding itself under international law to permanent abolition. In light of this, the Kyrgyz Republic can neither legally nor reputationally afford to reverse this course.
From moratorium to abolition
Kyrgyzstan’s abolition of the death penalty was the product of a gradual reform shaped by the State’s post-Soviet democratization path. Following its independence in 1991, the State retained the Soviet-era criminal code, which included capital punishment. Referred to as an example of a democratic State in Central Asia, the country took a decisive step in 1998, when then-President Askar Akayev introduced a moratorium on executions. This moratorium was renewed annually until 2007 when, finally, a constitutional reform abolished the death penalty entirely, replacing it with life imprisonment as the maximum sentence. As of now, Article 25 of the Kyrgyz Constitution stipulates unambiguously that death penalty is prohibited.
This reform was not merely symbolic: it was part of a broader effort to align Kyrgyzstan with international human rights standards and distinguish itself from more authoritarian neighbours. In 2010, Kyrgyzstan ratified the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, thereby assuming binding obligations under international law to permanently abolish capital punishment. Close involvement of civil society and international actors facilitated this decision by promoting progressive values in the society. Scholars and practitioners have univocally welcomed this step, as the Central Asian region is infamously lagging behind in terms of human rights protection due to its lack of a regional protection mechanism.
The Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, adopted in 1989, remains the only universal treaty dedicated to abolishing the death penalty. Its Article 1(2) categorically rejects the notion of capital punishment: “No one within the jurisdiction of a State Party to the present Protocol shall be executed”. Unlike other human rights treaties, the Protocol by its very nature does not permit denunciation or withdrawal, a conclusion firmly stated by the Human Rights Committee. In this sense, the Protocol represents somewhat of a point of no return for states that ratify it, locking in abolition as a permanent legal commitment.
The only legal loophole for restricting the scope of the Protocol is Article 2(1), according to which a state may, at the time of ratification or accession, make a reservation providing for the application of the capital punishment in times of war for the most heinous war crimes. However, this restriction does not apply to Japarov’s capital punishment aspirations, as there is neither war on Kyrgyzstan’s territory, nor did it make such reservation upon ratification.
Kyrgyzstan’s domestic hurdles
Even at the national level, reinstating the death penalty would pose obstacles for Japarov and his supporters, at least legally. The 2007 Constitution explicitly abolished capital punishment, and subsequent constitutional reforms have maintained this stance. While President Japarov may initiate constitutional amendments under Article 116(2) of the Constitution, any such change would require either a national referendum or a supermajority in the Parliament – both politically demanding processes.
Furthermore, as Kyrgyzstan has shifted from monism to dualism. Article 6 of its Constitution affirms that
“international treaties that entered into force in accordance with the legislation of the Kyrgyz Republic are an integral part of the legal system of the Kyrgyz Republic”.
Consequently, even if a constitutional amendment were passed, any attempt to legislate the reintroduction of death penalty would remain unconstitutional so long as Kyrgyzstan is bound by the Second Optional Protocol. As mentioned above, it is legally impossible for the state to denounce the Protocol. Therefore, upon the latter’s ratification, the domestic and international legal orders have become so intertwined that lawful reintroduction is effectively impossible.
Politically, however, it seems like the restitutionist aspirations of President Japarov might prevail over the letter of international law. In 2021, just months after he assumed office, a constitutional referendum approved amendments to the Constitution. Most importantly, the new Constitution entrenched regressive values at the foundation of Kyrgyzstan’s legal system. At the same time, sociological research has confirmed that traditional values retain importance in Kyrgyz society, creating an environment in which populist rhetoric thrives. As women are commonly treated as lacking autonomy and dependent on their male relatives, recent crimes against them (and children) have become catalysts for death penalty discussions. The problems of systemic corruption, fictitious separation of powers, and the lack of effective law enforcement under Japarov’s presidency only exacerbate the issue. Therefore, the political climate in Kyrgyzstan appears to be facilitating the Republic’s turn away from abolitionism, with the President wisely capitalising on the general public’s emotions to reintroduce the death penalty. What would the international legal consequences of such a move be?
Legal and political implications
First, reintroducing the death penalty would violate the Second Optional Protocol and, by extension, the ICCPR itself. Article 6 of the ICCPR, while not prohibiting the death penalty outright, restricts it to the “most serious crimes” and highlights that nothing in the provision should be invoked to prevent abolition. The Human Rights Committee has consistently interpreted Article 6 as embodying a progressive obligation towards abolition. By ratifying the Second Optional Protocol, Kyrgyzstan has already fulfilled that obligation – reversing the existing progress would amount to repudiating its treaty commitments in the only legal framework of human rights protection in force in the country.
Second, Kyrgyzstan would face scrutiny and criticism from UN bodies which are the only international force capable of influencing the Kyrgyz Government on human rights matters. The Human Rights Committee would almost certainly find the State in violation of its obligations, adding to an already unsatisfactory human rights record. The UN General Assembly, which has repeatedly passed resolutions calling for a moratorium on capital executions, would likely criticise the Republic’s Government for such a move. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has emphasised that the ratification of the Second Optional Protocol is irreversible, and any attempt to reintroduce executions would undermine the integrity of the international human rights system. The timing for Japarov’s populist statements about death penalty could not have been worse: they coincided with his State’s assessment under the Universal Periodic Review, where the reviewing States have issued almost three hundred recommendations on the improvement of the human rights situation in the Kyrgyz Republic.
Third, the reputational consequences would be severe. Kyrgyzstan has long sought to present itself as the most democratic state in Central Asia, distinguishing itself from neighbours such as Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, which retained capital punishment for longer. Reintroducing executions would inevitably align Kyrgyzstan with authoritarian practices and send a clear message to the rest of world: democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in Kyrgyzstan are under threat. President Japarov’s close cooperation with Russian President Vladimir Putin has already damaged the former’s reputation in the international arena. Since several scholars have argued that the global trend towards abolition is nearing the threshold of customary international law, Kyrgyzstan risks placing itself on the wrong side of history.
Finally, the practical consequences for international cooperation should not be underestimated. The European Union, an important partner in terms of regional development, has often reinforced its commitment against the use of the death penalty. Knowing how important its values are for Brussels, it is very likely that aid, trade preferences, and political support for Bishkek could all be jeopardised with a return to executions. In this sense, the costs of reintroduction would extend beyond legal condemnation to tangible economic and diplomatic repercussions.
Conclusion
Kyrgyzstan’s renewed debate over the death penalty is far more than a domestic matter of criminal justice: it is a test of its commitment to international law and human rights. Having ratified the Second Optional Protocol, the State bound itself irrevocably to abolition. Any attempt to reintroduce capital punishment would be complicated in domestic legal terms, unlawful under international law, and damaging to Kyrgyzstan’s international reputation.
The populist appeal of capital punishment – even in response to instances of horrific gender-based violence – cannot obscure the fact that it offers no real solution to systemic problems of law enforcement, judicial weakness, systemic corruption, and entrenched patriarchy. For Kyrgyzstan, the path forward lies not in reviving capital executions – but in strengthening institutions, effectively protecting victims, and addressing the complex root causes of violence. The country that once proudly stood as the only Central Asia’s democratic outlier must now uphold its international commitments and human rights legacy.