Poland’s Polarised Presidency
The first round of Poland’s presidential election has produced an inconclusive but politically charged outcome. Rafał Trzaskowski, candidate of the governing Civic Platform party (PO), received 31,36% of the votes. Karol Nawrocki, his opponent supported by the Law and Justice party (PiS), won 29,54%. With no candidate achieving an absolute majority, the second round will determine who succeeds Andrzej Duda in the Presidential Palace. This election marks yet another critical moment for Poland. In the short term, its outcome will be pivotal for the current government to deliver on its promises concerning the rule of law, the judiciary, and other areas. In the longer term, winning the presidential race is a strategic stepping stone towards consolidating or reclaiming power (the next parliamentary elections are scheduled for 2027).
The President and the rule of law
Under Poland’s political system, the president serves as head of state, while the prime minister leads the government. Although executive power is formally shared between them, the president’s competencies are limited. Nonetheless, the system of checks and balances gives him the possibility to counteract the parliamentary majority by vetoing legislation or referring bills passed by the parliament to the Constitutional Tribunal for review.
The outgoing president, Andrzej Duda, has played a crucial role in deepening Poland’s rule of law crisis. His near-total approval of legislation passed by the PiS-led majority in parliament between 2015 and 2023 allowed for far-reaching changes to the judiciary, prosecutor’s office, and multiple other institutions of law. Following the October 2023 parliamentary elections, which led to a change in government and PiS moving into opposition, President Duda quickly became a primary obstacle to reform efforts, directly opposing Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Minister of Justice Adam Bodnar. Duda embarked on a tactic of sabotaging any remedial measures by referring key bills aimed at restoring the independence of the Constitutional Tribunal and the National Council of Judiciary to the Constitutional Tribunal itself. It quickly became clear that advancing the repair of the rule of law in Poland depends on the outcome of the 2025 presidential election and a shift in the dynamics between the president and the government.
While the presidential campaign revolved mainly around the topics of economic policy, migration, security, and defence, the stakes for democracy and the rule of law are far-reaching. Whoever assumes the presidential office will be directly responsible for repairing the rule of law, overcoming the constitutional crisis, reforming the judiciary, and remedying problems with other pillars of the democratic system, like the media. Yet none of the thirteen initially registered candidates comprehensively covered these topics, instead addressing them selectively. With the exception of Karol Nawrocki, all candidates were critical towards the changes in the judicial system that occurred after 2015. Moreover, candidates from beyond the main governing parties (PiS and PO) stressed the necessity to free the public media from permanent political influence and combat state capture, nepotism, and patronage in state-owned enterprises. Their visions ranged from cooperative presidential leadership to more adversarial, anti-establishment approaches.
Two candidates, two conflicting visions
Ultimately, the presidential race will be decided between Rafał Trzaskowski and Karol Nawrocki. Both candidates warned that their opponent’s victory would bring detrimental consequences: either a continuation of legislative deadlock in case the PiS party succeeds, or complete state capture if the candidate of the governing PO party wins.
There is a visible rift between how both candidates want to approach the rule of law crisis in Poland. Trzaskowski has repeatedly called for urgent action. In a television interview, he expressed his willingness to seek a compromise in line with the Constitution to overcome the stalemate in the judiciary. He was critical of the Constitutional Tribunal in its current setup, for example, calling the 2020 ruling on abortion rights “disgraceful” and criticising the choice of Bogdan Święczkowski, the former State Prosecutor under Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro, for the President of the Constitutional Court. Although he expressed trust in the Supreme Court’s sound judgment regarding the validation of election results, he also supported the “incidental law” responding to the crisis in the Supreme Court caused by the defective appointment of some of its judges. Between 2009 and 2013, Trzaskowski was also an MEP for the European People’s Party, the largest and oldest group in the European Parliament, presenting a clearly pro-European stance. He often expressed understanding and support for EU actions aimed at curbing rule of law breaches in Poland. In case he wins the presidential office, it is to be expected that he would act in cooperation with the new Justice Minister in his attempts to normalise the status of the so-called “neo-judges”, appointed in a defective procedure.
In contrast, Karol Nawrocki’s campaign presented a very negative view of the state of the judiciary post-2023, challenging both the legality and legitimacy of measures undertaken since the change of government. At his campaign launch, Nawrocki alleged ongoing violations of Article 7 of the Constitution, which enshrines the principle of the rule of law. According to him, “the rule of law must return, because the Polish justice system lies on the ground”. He considered the rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Court as legitimate and described the nomination procedure of a new state prosecutor “shocking”, calling for the depoliticisation of the prosecutor’s office to be constitutionally enshrined. Nawrocki also suggested introducing a mixed election system for appointing members of the National Council of the Judiciary. In a chapter of his manifesto called “A normal state”, Nawrocki characterised the judicial system as being in a state of “chaos” and called for a non-partisan consensus to restore “fair/just, objective and apolitical courts”. The manifesto also highlighted obstacles to access to justice, calling for improved court performance through stabilisation, digitalisation, and acceleration. Failing to remedy the current malaise of the court system should result in a referendum, resorting to the voice of the people to legitimise his future actions.
The divergence between the two leading candidates on matters of the rule of law, democracy, and other issues, like the status of the public media, could not be more pronounced. Their opposing stances on the legitimacy of judicial institutions are embedded in an intensely polarised political climate. The rule of law in Poland has become a pawn in the political game. Citizens see it through the lens of partisan identity: those supporting the PiS saw reforms as legitimate, while the supporters of the current government demand their reversal. A merit-based debate is sabotaged by attempts to further instrumentalise state institutions for immediate political gains.
Where is Poland headed?
Over the course of a little more than a year and a half, Poland has undergone a rapid electoral cycle – parliamentary, regional, European, and now presidential elections. This sequence has deepened the polarisation between the two main competitors, PO and PiS. While the ideological divide still matters (in terms of policy positions), it is increasingly the affective polarisation (emotions and opinions) that threatens democratic cohesion. Voters are becoming entrenched in mutually distrustful political camps in which political identity becomes a social identity.
A victory for Rafał Trzaskowski, supported by the PO party leading the government, would, with high probability, help launch a full-scale remedial process in the judiciary, to date blocked by Andrzej Duda. A Trzaskowski presidency would also support broader democratic reforms, such as strengthening the independence of public media, and likely foster constructive relations with both the government and the European Union.
In the event that Karol Nawrocki wins, it is to be expected that the remedial process in the judiciary and associated reforms in other disputed areas would stall. Nawrocki would continue Duda’s strategy of vetoing reform bills or referring them to the Constitutional Tribunal. The fierce political conflict would continue to spill over to the systemic fundamentals of the state, prolonging the impasse and constitutional chaos. Nawrocki’s Euroscepticism is also likely to become more pronounced if he assumes office, for example, when transposing EU laws into the Polish legal system or accepting and respecting EU decisions regarding the rule of law in Poland.
The first round of the election revealed a noticeable shift to the right in Polish society, not only at the narrative level but also in the actual results of far-right candidates, such as Sławomir Mentzen (Konfederacja) and Grzegorz Braun. They both received relatively high support: 14,81% and 6,34%, respectively. There is an increasing gap in voting preferences along age and gender. While older voters are still caught in the PiS-PO deadlock, young people are growing tired of this duopoly, seeking political alternatives, such as the more radical left or the new right. Moreover, gender-based disparities in political preferences have become more pronounced, with men pivoting towards the far-right and women exhibiting more moderate preferences. Ultimately, neither Trzaskowski nor Nawrocki can be overly confident. The outcome will largely hinge on how more than 30% of voters – those who supported left-wing and anti-establishment far-right candidates – decide to cast their ballots in the second round, as well as on overall turnout levels. For the rule of law in Poland, this election represents a decisive juncture: either a renewed opportunity for its restitution or a further step towards its decline.
This article is based on the outcomes of a comparative analysis of presidential manifestos in Poland by Democracy Reporting International. The research was carried out as part of the re:constitution programme financed by Stiftung Mercator. The full publication is available here.