Rodina And Borisova V. Latvia And The Principle Of Self-Defending Democracy
Introduction
The European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR), in its recent judgment on 10 July 2025 in the case of Rodina and Borisova v. Latvia, examined the applicants’ complaints regarding the refusals of domestic authorities to authorize the assemblies they wished to hold on 9 May and 23 September 2014. The ECtHR analyzed the freedom of peaceful assembly within the context of the principle of self-defending democracy. It reaffirmed that no one should be permitted to invoke the provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) to weaken or destroy the ideals and values of a democratic society.
This conclusion is fundamentally important, as it embodies the principle of self-defending democracy, which refers to the legitimate and preventive defense of democracy against self-destruction and external threats. Its purpose is to protect the democratic order from actors seeking to undermine it through the misuse of legal means in ways that contradict democratic principles. As noted by Associate Professor J. Pleps, “a direct concretization of the principle of self-defensive democracy is the nuclear weapon enshrined in the legal system, the purpose of which is not regular application but deterrence of potential addressees from their intended actions against the democratic order of the State” (Pleps J. Pašaizsargājošās demokrātijas princips Latvijas tiesiskajā sistēmā. Augstākās Tiesas Biļetens Nr. 27, 2023, 64.-67. lpp).
The decision demonstrates the ECtHR’s consistent approach to its understanding of the concept of a self-defending democracy, as reflected not only in the aforementioned case but also in earlier rulings such as Ždanoka v. Latvia (no. 58278/00), Petropavlovskis v. Latvia (no. 44230/06), Ždanoka v. Latvia II (no. 42221/18).
Historical context of the cases brought before the ECtHR
Following World War II, the USSR declared 9 May as Victory Day, and from 1965, it became a public holiday. In 1985, a monument dedicated to the Soviet Army, known as “Liberators of Soviet Latvia and Riga from the German Fascist Invaders” (the Soviet Victory Monument), was unveiled in Riga. However, after Latvia regained its independence in 1991, the Latvian government ceased to recognize 9 May as a public holiday.
Military personnel and pensioners who remained in Latvia after 1994, as well as those who had migrated there from other parts of the USSR during the Soviet occupation, considered the Soviet Army to be the liberators of the Soviet Union (including Latvia) from the Nazis.
Conversely, Latvians who had experienced Russification policies and oppression during the unlawful occupation and annexation by the Soviet Union, and their descendants, viewed the Soviet Victory Monument and the celebration of Victory Day as symbols of the atrocities that followed the loss of Latvia’s independence prior to World War II.
After the Russian Federation gained military and political control of Crimea (including the city of Sevastopol) in the spring of 2014, and especially after its armed attack and military invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, debates about the demolition of the Soviet Victory Monument and the appropriateness of Victory Day celebrations resurfaced in Latvian society. On 25 August 2022, the Soviet Victory Monument was completely demolished.
Additionally, in 2023, the Latvian Parliament (Saeima) adopted a law prohibiting public demonstrations, marches, and pickets throughout Latvia on May 9, except for events that express solidarity with the Ukrainian nation, whose national sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity are threatened due to Russian military aggression, and commemorating those who have suffered and died in Ukraine (nos. 2623/16 and 2299/16, Rodina and Borisova v Latvia, §§ 6-11).
Background information regarding the first and second applicants in the ECtHR case
On 9 May 2014, the first applicant wished to organize a demonstration and a “Russian march” from the Square of Latvian Riflemen to the Soviet Victory Monument. He wished to gather Russians living in Latvia and create a human chain among the participants. The Security Police advised against allowing the events for which the first applicant sought authorization. The Riga City Council (the City Council), relying on the report from the Security Police, refused to authorize the assemblies requested by the first applicant, concluding that the planned events were aimed at inciting national hatred.
On 5 September 2014, the second applicant requested authorization for a demonstration to be held on 23 September 2014 in front of the Ukrainian embassy in Riga. The stated aim of the demonstration was to call for an end to the war in southeastern Ukraine. In this regard, the Security Police issued a report stating that the second applicant had engaged in activities aimed against the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine. As a result, the City Council refused to authorize the demonstration. However, despite the prohibition of the planned event, a smaller demonstration (a picket) took place in front of the Ukrainian embassy.
Both applicants (separately) challenged the bans imposed by the City Council, and in both cases, the Administrative District Court upheld the bans while dismissing the applicants’ appeals. Subsequently, both applicants lodged cassations, and the SC expressed no doubts regarding the lawfulness of the lower courts’ judgments. On 8 July 2015 the SC noted in both cases that the Administrative District Court had thoroughly examined the circumstances and determined that the bans were justified (see more details: nos. 2623/16 and 2299/16, Rodina and Borisova v Latvia, §§ 16, 18, 20, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 32, 35, 36, 38, 42, 43, 45, 48, 50, 51). As a result, both applicants lodged applications with the ECtHR in January 2016, which were decided on 10 July 2025.
The ECtHR’s findings
Firstly, the ECtHR recalled that the right to freedom of assembly, which is one of the foundations of a democratic society, is subject to several exceptions that must be narrowly interpreted. The necessity for any restrictions must be convincingly demonstrated. Secondly, the ECtHR acknowledged that the interference with the applicants’ rights pursued several legitimate aims referred to in Article 11 of the Convention, notably national security, public safety, the prevention of disorder, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Thirdly, the ECtHR emphasized that the freedom of assembly protects demonstrations that may annoy or offend those who oppose the ideas or claims being promoted (nos. 2623/16 and 2299/16, Rodina and Borisova v Latvia, §§ 99, 100, 103).
However, in the particular case, the ECtHR, referring to information from the Latvian security agencies’ publicly available reports, noted that the so-called “compatriots policy” pursued by the Russian Federation and its supporters constituted one of the most significant threats to Latvia’s national security in 2014. The objectives of the “compatriots policy” include the protection of “compatriots” residing abroad, the strengthening of the Russian language, and the promotion of Russian culture. This policy is often exploited as a tool for foreign policy manipulation to achieve geopolitical interests in various countries, including Latvia. Supporters of the “compatriots policy” who align with Russian interests are expected to continue posing significant security risks in these countries. Therefore, certain individuals have utilized provocative statements intended to incite conflict within Latvian society, and it was observed that the rhetoric used by these individuals became more radical following the events of 2014, when the Russian Federation gained military and political control over parts of Ukraine (nos. 2623/16 and 2299/16, Rodina and Borisova v Latvia, §62).
According to a report issued by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre for Excellence, it was not the “compatriots policy” itself that posed a direct threat to national security in the region, but rather the Russian Federation’s ability to create a narrative of “discrimination” in its neighboring countries. This narrative could be used to justify interference in the internal affairs of these states, including the potential use of military force against them. Given that Latvia borders the Russian Federation, which invaded parts of Georgia in 2008 and gained military and political control over Crimea (including the city of Sevastopol) and the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the Donbass area of eastern Ukraine in spring 2014, there was a real risk of disorder in Latvia at that time. During this period, Latvia had increasingly legitimate reasons to fear for its security, territorial integrity, and democratic order (nos. 2623/16 and 2299/16, Rodina and Borisova v Latvia, §111).
Consequently, given the background information regarding both applicants and their actions, the Court concluded that the applicants acted as supporters of the “compatriots policy” and align with Russian interests. The Court noted that the ban on the planned demonstration and march of 9 May 2014 was mainly based on the view that the first applicant’s activities and the slogans used at its previous events were seen as promoting intolerance, societal tension and conflict, particularly by emphasizing the superiority of the Russian nation and implicitly rejecting the Latvian nation and language. As for the planned demonstration of 23 September 2014, the government, referring to the conclusions of the domestic courts, considered that it was intended to convey aggressive and provocative messages amounting to “war propaganda” and to express support for unrecognized separatist entities and their paramilitary forces in eastern Ukraine (nos. 2623/16 and 2299/16, Rodina and Borisova v Latvia, § 106 and 109).
Therefore, the ECtHR reiterated that democracy constitutes a fundamental element of the “European public order.” Given the clear connection between the Convention and democracy, no one should be permitted to invoke its provisions to undermine or destroy the ideals and values of a democratic society. Consequently, to ensure the stability and effectiveness of a democratic system, a state may need to take specific measures to protect itself. However, whenever a state intends to invoke the principle of “a democracy capable of defending itself” to justify interference with individual rights, it must carefully assess the scope and consequences of the proposed measures. This assessment should ensure that a proper balance is achieved between the requirements outlined in Article 11(2) of the Convention and the free expression of opinions by individuals assembled in public spaces, whether by word, gesture, or silence (nos. 2623/16 and 2299/16, Rodina and Borisova v Latvia, §104).
In this case, the ECtHR explicitly acknowledged that banning the events constituted an interference with the applicants’ rights under Article 11 of the Convention. However, this interference was found to be prescribed by law, pursued legitimate aims-namely, the protection of public order, the prevention of disorder, and the protection of the rights of others-and was considered proportionate, meeting a “pressing social need.” Consequently, the ECtHR found no violation of Article 11 of the Convention in these specific circumstances (nos. 2623/16 and 2299/16, Rodina and Borisova v Latvia, §§101, 117, 119-122).
Conclusion
The principle of self-defending democracy has become crucial for protecting democracy against self-destruction and external threats, particularly in light of the challenges posed by Russia. In this case, the ECtHR reaffirmed that states are entitled to prevent the abuse of democratic rights for purposes that contradict democratic values. The ECtHR emphasized that the bans were upheld because they addressed specific events posing real, context-sensitive risks, not generalized or hypothetical threats. This illustrates that the principle of self-defending democracy requires context-aware restrictions, particularly when facing threats to democracy. It is an important ruling for countering anti-democratic movements, propaganda, or disinformation, while preserving the core values of pluralism and the rule of law.
The research is financed by the Recovery and Resilience Facility project “Internal and External Consolidation of the University of Latvia” (No. 5.2.1.1.i.0/2/24/I/CFLA/007).