On Human Rights Day, 10 December 2025, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe convened an informal ministerial conference. The reason, he stated, was that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR, Court) has come under pressure from its member states. Given the ongoing interference with the Court, I propose that the latter should define and apply contempt-of-court (contempt) measures to sanction member states intruding on its independence and impartiality. Member states should pre-emptively accept such measures. States that publicly put political pressure on the Court, try to influence its judgments outside of proceedings, weaponize it, attempt to intimidate it, blame or scapegoat it for populist purposes, misrepresent its case law and role, or disrespect its authority in any other manner, should face accountability under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, Convention), for the Court to define. As a minimum, the Court could consider drawing inferences against such states in relevant cases and issuing injunctions against them.

What is contempt of court?

Contempt of court is any behaviour, act, or omission that disrespects or defies the authority, dignity, or process of a court, interfering with justice, including prejudicing a case (e.g., through (social) media). Britannica defines it as “speech or behavior that does not show proper respect to a court” and as “insult to, interference with, or violation of a sovereign court”. It further determines the “primary importance of the notion of contempt [as] warrant[ing] judicial action in defense of the judicial power itself”.

Recent state contempt towards the Court

In 2025, the Court has faced unhealthy politicization – political pressure – with member states seeking to weaponize it, the Council of Europe Secretary General has implied. The pressure initially came from states in an “open letter”, in which they overtly questioned the Court’s interpretation of the Convention and proposed to change the manner in which it decides “migration” cases, by limiting the human rights of “criminal foreigners”.

I argue that such political messaging seeking to stigmatise and control the Court amounts to the legal violation known as contempt-of-court. It blatantly disrespects the Court, scapegoating it to cater to popular xenophobic demands to “stop the boats” (see also Donald). Moreover, it overtly seeks to interfere with justice by directly influencing the outcome of multiple cases, prejudicing the fundamental rights of (entire classes of) (highly vulnerable) individuals. The “open letter” flagrantly disregards the Court’s autonomy, its exclusive prerogative to bindingly interpret the Convention, taking the liberty to undermine and “right” its interpretation.

Human rights commentators have concurred that this public challenge by governments of the Court’s case law aims to pressure the Court (see Steininger, Buyse, Hilpold, Forde, Donald). They have noted the illegitimacy of this governmental attempt to meddle in the Court’s jurisprudence, subverting its authority, and marring its impartiality (see also Ní Chinnéide and Sevrin, and Vishchyk and Pizzi).

Additionally, the openly xenophobic letter, which tries to discredit the Court for defending migrants and attacks it based on its perceived association with “foreigners”, mirrors – and is equally deplorable as – the denounced manner in which states vilify and seek to suppress human rights defenders (HRDs) advocating for migrants (see here regarding the European context of official negative stereotyping and intimidation of such HRDs).

The Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner has identified the letter’s blaming of the Court as a form of the now normalised “laying of the blame for social ills on foreigners”, the persistent “othering” and “disparagement” of migrants, which also engenders hate crime.

More contempt

Belgium, one of the signatories of the said letter, refuses to comply with the ECtHR “reception crisis” judgments. United Kingdom politicians threaten to withdraw from the Convention, framing it as an obstacle to border control. Poland openly refuses to comply with ECtHR judgments on judicial reform (Vishchyk and Pizzi).

At the informal ministerial conference on Human Rights Day, 27 member states made a joint Statement referring to, and developing, the letter of the nine. They claimed that “a right balance has to be found” between migrants’ rights and their own interests, implying that the Court-defined balance is wrong. The states sought to “adjust” the Court-defined balance by depreciating the ECHR right to family life of “foreigners convicted of serious crimes”. The states explicitly stated the purpose of such “rebalancing” is to ensure they are never unable to expel such foreigners.

In this Statement, the states sought to rectify the Court’s case law on freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment as well. Directly instructing the Court on how to interpret this freedom, they claimed that its scope should be “constrained to the most serious issues”, allowing them to expel “foreign criminals” despite issues of healthcare and prison conditions.

At the conference, the Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner admonished states “to ensure that all discourse and proposals do nothing to diminish the independence of the [Court] or indeed of any other court”. He affirmed: “The principle of independence of the judiciary is essential to the rule of law state.”

ECHR accountability for all that contempt

I argue that such interference as the nine states’ letter and the 27 states’ joint Statement seeking to scapegoat the Court and force it to change its case law, which amounts to contempt of court contravening the rule of law, should have legal consequences under the ECHR. There should be ECHR accountability for such state acts in contempt of the ECtHR.

The ECtHR could define and impose such liability, which states should embrace under the very declaration (or other instrument) that they will use in 2026 to limit their own ECHR duties vis-à-vis the human rights of migrants/foreigners.

What would such liability entail? For example, in pending cases, the Court could consider drawing from such states’ statements inferences of their bad faith vis-à-vis migrants’ rights, including for purposes of interim relief. It could presume that the respondent states’ intent was not to respect such individuals’ ECHR rights, e.g., their rights as defined by the Court; that the states’ notion of “proportionality” in pursuing their purported legitimate aims was not the same as the authentic one – the one the Court has defined. It could consider finding ECHR violations and ordering structural relief (Article 46 ECHR) based on the respondents’ failure to rebut such inferences.

Additionally, the Court could consider awarding enhanced compensation to applicants in relevant cases, as undue pressure on the Court to decide in favour of states – and against those applicants – adversely affects the latter’s right to a fair process under their right to individual application (Article 34 ECHR). Indeed, the Court could consider holding that such anti-migrant/xenophobic statements by states seeking to redefine their own victims’ ECHR rights are a breach per se of the relevant applicants’ right to individual application, with the appropriate consequences under the case law. At the very least, by doing so, the Court would document states’ infractions against its integrity, exposing them, as well as shine a light on its own dignity by protecting it. Moreover, it would lead the way for embattled domestic courts and judges. Most importantly, it would show migrants that, no matter the cost, it will keep on recognising their personality before the law as it should.

Perhaps, as a consequence, the states would retaliate by seeking to limit the Convention and curtail the Court, yet they would have a good reason to do so through the appropriate procedures, in a manner respectful of the Court, e.g. of the rule of law.

Conclusion

Out of self-respect, Council of Europe states – which by their very membership self-identify as rule-of-law states – should proactively accept ECtHR-defined and imposed contempt-of-court measures under the ECHR. This is a matter of (re)aligning with the rule of law. States should do so using the same (political) instrument by which they will in 2026 seek to curtail migrants’ ECHR rights. Most member states have shown no respect for the human rights of foreigners whom they other. Nevertheless, they should demonstrate respect for their own (purported) rule-of-law character by accepting ECHR contempt-of-court accountability for themselves and their peers.