After the Brazilian Supreme Court convicted Bolsonaro and other military figures for their role in the January 8, 2023, coup attempt, many saw this as a positive example for the world (though some disagreed). However, optimism was soon challenged as Congress began debating amnesty and reductions in penalties. Last week, Congress approved the so-called Dosimetry Bill, which does not grant amnesty but allows for a significant reduction in sentences for those convicted. The bill could now be vetoed by President Lula da Silva, prompting Congress to override the veto.

At the time of the conviction, there were grounds for optimism. Bolsonaro was condemned, and negotiations between President Lula’s administration and Trump led to the suspension of key U.S. coercive measures against Brazil for prosecuting Bolsonaro, including tariffs and the targeting of Brazilian Supreme Court justices through the Magnitsky Act. Justice Moraes, the rapporteur and central figure in Bolsonaro’s prosecution, hailed these developments as a “triple victory”: for the judiciary, which “did not yield to threats”; for national sovereignty; and for democracy. In light of the Dosimetry Bill, however, such declarations of triumph warrant reconsideration.

The Supreme Court at (or beyond) the edge of politics

Concerning the judicial branch, few would deny the decisive role of the Brazilian Supreme Court, particularly Justice Moraes, in protecting Brazilian democracy. Yet Bolsonaro’s conviction may mark the culmination of a Court that has expanded its powers to the limit over the last decades. Justices have increasingly served as political arbiters, exercising significant influence over policy through individual powers and agenda-setting. This is especially true for its already extensive constitutional criminal jurisdiction over top politicians, which has grown after major corruption scandals to expand the courts’ domain over politics, but at a cost.

First, the Court’s influence over politicians’ fates has reshaped its internal dynamics and heightened sensitivity to broader political contexts. It no longer merely debates and adjudicates constitutional disputes; it actively engages at every stage, shaping outcomes through hands-on involvement in the political landscape. The Dosimetry Bill illustrates this trend: Under the new rules, penalties for coup d’état and violent overthrow of democratic rule of law will no longer be cumulative; only the higher sentence, about 4 to 12 years for an attempted coup, will apply. The bill speeds up sentence progression, lowers the time before release, and allows work or study days to reduce sentences. Lawyers estimate Bolsonaro’s time in a closed regime could be reduced to 2 years and 4 months, effectively nearly granting amnesty for his 27-year conviction. Journalists report that the Court agreed not to obstruct its passage, and Senators indicate that Justice Moraes participated in negotiations reducing the proposal from total amnesty to a shorter sentence. Far from showing deference to the Legislative Branch, this episode, if confirmed, demonstrates a dangerous blurring of the line between judicial adjudication and political governance.

Secondly, the Court’s efforts to defend itself against Bolsonaro and his supporters have further expanded its powers. It is now perceived as capable of almost anything, often acting beyond explicit constitutional limits. The Fake News Inquiry illustrates this expansion: The Court investigated coordinated disinformation campaigns targeting it without external provocation, ordering searches, blocking social media accounts, and authorizing independent investigations, all justified as necessary to protect institutional integrity and uphold democratic order. This assertiveness has, in turn, normalized legislative and social backlash against “judicial overreach,” with criticism of the Court’s power now part of mainstream debate. From constitutional theory`s perspective, even if judicial militancy against Bolsonaro is justified for a “good cause,” it raises important questions about the future use of these powers and who decides what constitutes a good cause.

Justice Mendes’s recent injunction altering the application of Brazil’s Impeachment Law to Supreme Court justices illustrates that the Court’s defensive expansion goes beyond responding to Bolsonaro’s attacks. Mendes temporarily suspended provisions governing the removal of Supreme Court Justices, restricted impeachment initiation, raised the Senate quorum, and barred impeachment based solely on the substantive merits of judicial decisions. He later partially withdrew the injunction, widely seen as a negotiated compromise with Congress, reinforcing perceptions of the Court’s increasingly strategic and political posture.

Finally, the Court’s sustained involvement in political crises has reshaped how the Executive perceives it: as an institution too consequential to be left unmonitored. This perception has influenced judicial appointments, favoring justices capable of acting politically as well as juridically. The preference is not merely for ideologically aligned or policy-oriented judges, but for institutional actors able to read political contexts, engage in strategic dialogue, and intervene decisively to preserve governability. As a result, once political engagement becomes a function of the Court’s composition, it will be increasingly complex for the Court to act differently in the future. Thus, Bolsonaro’s conviction, though legally necessary, may mark the point at which the Court ventured too far from the constitutional shoreline, without a clear or secure path back.

Foreign pressure as a de facto check on domestic politics

Regarding national sovereignty, although Trump suspended tariffs and the application of the Magnitsky Act, the underlying threats persist. U.S. officials explicitly linked the lifting of sanctions to progress on the “amnesty bill” (the Dosimetry Bill) for Bolsonaro and others convicted, framing these political efforts as evidence that Bolsonaro faced “lawfare.” Far from signaling an end to U.S. pressure, this situation reinforces its coercive mechanisms in a dormant but persistent form and sustains the Brazilian far-right’s narrative of persecution. Thus, it effectively integrates the U.S. into Brazil’s system of checks and balances.

For example, the “favors” extended by Trump through the removal of sanctions constrain Lula’s foreign-policy autonomy, weakening Brazil’s ability to assert regional influence and respond independently to international crises, including U.S. summary executions, oil piracy, and the potential invasion of Venezuelan territory. To avoid backlash from sectors affected by U.S. tariffs, President Lula and Congress may prevent public criticism of Washington’s apparent revival of the Monroe Doctrine (opposing European colonialism while laying the groundwork for a century of U.S. intervention in Latin America). Supreme Court justices could also consider potential exposure under the Magnitsky Act when ruling on issues such as the constitutionality of the Dosimetry Bill. Overall, rather than signaling a victory for national sovereignty, U.S. efforts to promote favored political factions in the region and to force others to adapt have subordinated domestic political processes, reflecting a contemporary form of imperial influence.

Elite ambiguous liberalism and the normalization of democratic rupture

Regarding Brazilian democracy, granting Bolsonaro a de facto amnesty exposes at least two enduring weaknesses in the country’s democratic framework. First, it reflects a persistent pattern in Brazilian political history in which conservative elites, often leveraging the military, intervene to block governments or candidates pursuing undesired social agendas or to protect entrenched interests. This pattern exemplifies Brazilian “ambiguous liberalism,” where the norms and principles of constitutional liberalism are upheld only so long as the core interests of elites remain unthreatened. Once those interests are challenged, disrupting democratic procedures and bending the fundamental principle of equality before the law becomes a viable strategy.

The Dosimetry Bill demonstrates how these disruption strategies are frequently combined with a pre-arranged exit plan: measures such as amnesty or sentence reduction guarantee a return to stability once the extra-constitutional effort collapses or, at the latest, during the bargaining processes of negotiated democratic transitions when authoritarian regimes fall. These measures are often justified as a means of pacifying the country, but they ultimately perpetuate a recurring threat to the political system by lowering the costs of future disruption. The historical continuity is striking. During the military dictatorship (and many times before), elites both supported the 1964 coup and later endorsed amnesty for the regime’s crimes, embedding impunity within the constitutional order.

The protests sparked by the bill`s approval, with slogans like “no amnesty” and “Congress, enemy of the people,” and polls show most oppose amnesty for Bolsonaro. These events reveal a growing disconnection between Congress and the public. Journalists suggest the proposal was a bargaining chip for conservative forces to negotiate with Bolsonaro’s family, possibly to withdraw his son from the 2026 race, anticipated to be won by Lula, and unify right-wing support behind São Paulo’s governor, indicating the political elites’ questionable and continuous willingness to compromise Brazilian democracy for short-term objectives.

Military political interference and the entrenchment of impunity

Second, portraying the Armed Forces as law-abiding while reducing the coup attempt to the actions of “rotten apples” functioned as a strategy to shield the institution from responsibility for anti-democratic conduct. Even if this narrative was already fragile, it was decisively undermined by the military’s behavior during the Supreme Court proceedings against Bolsonaro and senior officers. Throughout the trials, high-ranking military officials sought to influence outcomes by requesting meetings with Justice Moraes to secure reduced penalties. Notably, these efforts involved General Tomás Paiva, the Army commander appointed by President Lula and widely regarded as a legalist – even a commander installed immediately after the coup attempt sought to obtain better outcomes for officers who tried to undermine the constitutional order. This reveals an institutional pattern that cannot plausibly be reduced to the misconduct of isolated individuals.

This pattern has longstanding historical roots and was visible after the military dictatorship ended. During the 1987–1988 Constituent Assembly, amid a negotiated democratic transition supported by conservative allies, the military remained able to advocate for constitutional measures that defended their interests. These included the embedding of the 1979 Amnesty Law created by the army during the military regime into the 1988 Constitution, the exclusion of the non-prescription of torture, and avoiding the creation of a civilian minister of defense (which only happened in 1999). It also preserved a longstanding tradition, dating back to Brazil’s second Constitution of 1891, of defining the military’s role in deliberately ambiguous terms. Such terms have historically allowed later reinterpretations by elites and the barracks, thereby enabling political interference. This indicates that while prosecuting the military is essential, it is not sufficient if the country does not implement significant reforms in its civil-military relations.

Even if the military never entirely withdrew from politics after the end of the dictatorship (1964–1985), there was at least a relative hiatus in its direct intervention. That hiatus effectively ended when former President Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016) promoted investigations into human rights violations committed during the regime. From that point on, the armed forces gradually reasserted themselves politically, maintaining influence after Rousseff’s impeachment and later becoming a pillar of Bolsonaro’s government. Now, immediately following the events of January 8, 2023, they are already fully active, deploying strong corporate solidarity to shield members from accountability and protect institutional interests.

Conclusion

The Brazilian example shows that, contrary to Justice Moraes’ optimistic view of the judiciary, national sovereignty, and democracy, the Dosimetry Bill offers little reason for celebration. The Supreme Court’s growing political role carries risks and cannot last forever. Pressuring domestic issues to align with international pressures deepens U.S. influence in Brazilian politics. Furthermore, a long-standing pattern among political elites and the military of disrupting the constitutional order without facing consequences while securing legal or political escape routes remains entrenched, perpetuating a fragile constitutional order in which democratic disruptions are contained but not fully addressed. What Justice Moraes hailed as a triumph may instead reflect a precarious equilibrium: a fragile normalcy in which democracy is neither fully secured nor self-sustaining, and in which future crises are, to a large extent, contracted into the political system by the very actors entrusted with upholding it.